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iPreface 
The debate on the precautionary principle has highlighted the fact that effective 
management of the risks associated with technological development will require 
increased democratisation, adaptability and reflexivity in public decision making.  
While science will become increasingly important in addressing these risks, it will also 
become increasingly insufficient. Scientists & engineers participating in regulatory 
decision making will require new methodologies, such that the assessments they 
perform contribute to fostering adaptability and reflexivity in decision making.  It this 
context, this Ph.D. dissertation illustrates a novel approach to diagnosing and 
communicating the uncertainty that characterises scientific assessments of complex 
policy problems.   
Chapter 1 of this dissertation is aimed at justifying the need for new methods of 
uncertainty assessment.  Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework upon which the 
novel approach applied in this project is based, essentially examining the question: how 
does uncertainty manifest itself in the context of policy relevant sciences?  Chapters 3 
and 4 illustrate how this conceptual framework was applied through expert elicitations 
focusing on two different case studies related to the risk assessment of genetically 
modified crops. Chapter 5 offers reflections on the experiences gained in the process of 
applying the conceptual framework.     
This dissertation was primarily written for a target audience of natural scientists and 
engineers involved in policy relevant sciences. The goal was to illustrate the basis for 
conducting uncertainty analysis in policy relevant sciences, and to demonstrate how 
this could be done. In addition to these natural scientists and engineers, the dissertation 
will also be of interest to the multi-disciplinary community of scholars studying the 
science-policy interface, as well as to those who have a particular interest in the debate 
on the risks and regulation of genetically modified crops.   
The work presented in this dissertation was funded by a Ph.D. grant awarded by the 
Technical University of Denmark (DTU). The study was conducted at the Institute for 
Environment & Resources DTU, from September 2001 until September 2005.  The 
work was initiated under the supervision of professor Poul Harremoës, and pursued 
under the supervision of associate professor Anders Baun. The dissertation is primarily 
based on five journal articles: 
(i) Walker, WE, P Harremoës, J Rotmans, JP van der Sluijs, MBA van Asselt, P 
Janssen, MP Krayer von Krauss. (2003): Defining uncertainty. A conceptual 
basis for uncertainty management in model-based decision support.  Integrated 
Assessment, 4, (1), 5-17.
(ii) Krayer von Krauss MP, E Casman, MJ Small. (2004). Elicitation of expert 
judgments of uncertainty in the risk assessment of herbicide tolerant oilseed 
crops, Journal of Risk Analysis,  24, (6), 1515-1527. 
(iii) Krayer von Krauss, MP, MBA Van Asselt, M Henze, J Ravetz and MB Beck. 
(2005). Uncertainty and Precaution in Environmental Management.  Water 
Science & Technology, 52, (6), 1-9.
ii
(iv) Krayer von Krauss, MP, PHM Janssen (2005). Using the W&H integrated 
uncertainty analysis framework with non-initiated experts. Water Science & 
Technology, 52, (6), 145-152. 
(v) Krayer von Krauss, MP, M Kaiser, V Almaas, J van der Sluijs, P Kloprogge 
(in preparation).  Diagnosing & Communicating Scientific Uncertainty: a Case 
Study of Transgene Silencing.   
All of the articles mentioned above are included as appendices to the dissertation. The 
papers are not included in this www-version but can be obtained from the Library at the 
Institute of Environment & Resources, Bygningstorvet, Building 115,  Technical 
University of Denmark, DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby  (library@er.dtu.dk).  
In addition to these, the following articles and abstracts have been published partially 
on the basis of this dissertation.   
Harremoës, P, MP Krayer von Krauss. (2002).  Caring, daring and precaution. 
Abstract No. 307. In: Achieving global environmental quality: Integrating science and 
management. SETAC 23rd Annual Meeting in North America, 16-20 November Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Abstract Book, p. 69. Society of Environmental Toxicology and 
Chemistry, Brussels. 
Jensen, KK, C Gamborg, KH Madsen, RB Jørgensen, MP Krayer von Krauss, AP 
Folker, P Sandøe. (2003). Making the EU "risk window" transparent: The normative 
foundations of the environmental risk assessment of GMOs.  Environmental Biosafety 
Research, 3, 161-171.   
Meyer, G, AP Folker, RB Jørgensen, MP Krayer von Krauss, P Sandøe, G. Tveit.  
(2005). The factualization of uncertainty: Risk, politics, and genetically modified crops 
– a case of rape. Agriculture and Human Values, 22, (2), 235 – 242. 
Gee, D., MP Krayer von Krauss.  (2005). Late lessons from early warnings: towards 
precaution and realism in research and policy.  Water Science & Technology, 52 (6), 
25-34.
Krayer von Krauss, MP, WE Walker, JP van der Sluijs, PHM Janssen, MBA van 
Asselt, J Rotmans.  (2006).  Response to “To what extent, and how, might uncertainty 
be defined” by Norton, Brown, and Mysiak.  Integrated Assessment, 6 (1), 89-94. 
I would like to acknowledge Poul Harremoës for providing the vision and leadership 
which lead to me receiving a PhD scholarship to work on a topic that lay clearly outside 
of the departmental research priorities.  For this and the other opportunities he provided 
me with, I am grateful. I would also like to thank Anders Baun for accepting to inherit 
the supervision of a project which few people in the department were familiar with, and 
for his unwavering support ever since then.   
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valuable to my work, as well as the support required to cope with the loss of Poul 
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that lead to the financial support provided for the conference Uncertainty and 
Precaution in Environmental Management by the European Environmental Agency.  
At the Institute for Environment & Resources DTU, I would like to thank the librarians 
Grete Hansen and Helle Offenberg for their patience with me; Marianna Harder Olesen, 
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Abstract
In addition to possessing the expert knowledge and technical know-how required to 
provide public services, engineers and scientists function as an important source of 
legitimization for regulatory decisions.  According to the liberal philosophy upon which 
the regulatory process is based, regulatory authorities should only intervene in instances 
where development could lead to harmful effects.  Their decision to intervene should be 
based on facts, ideally considered within the framework of a rigorous rational 
methodology (e.g. risk assessment) so as to ensure that their interpretation of the facts 
is as objective as possible.  This can be quite problematic in situations where scientific 
knowledge is limited, facts are uncertain, the stakes are high and values are conflicting.   
In many cases, the complexity of the regulatory issues scientists and engineers are 
asked to study far surpasses that of typical laboratory problems.  Knowledge is often 
limited and the facts are uncertain.  That which has commonly been referred to under 
the umbrella term ‘uncertainty’ actually hides important technical distinctions. The 
well-established notion of uncertainty as a statistical or probabilistic concept leaves out 
many important aspects of the uncertainty encountered when assessing complex policy 
problems, such as the uncertainty generated by assumptions and ignorance of cause-
effect relationships.   
The precautionary paradigm1 has emerged in the context of the above realisations.  
Under this paradigm, the role of scientists and engineers is to participate in the 
collective effort of producing, evaluating and applying knowledge, considering the 
interests at stake, and making a necessarily provisional decision. Formal methods are 
required for experts to assess uncertainty, and these methods must transcend the notion 
of uncertainty as a statistical or probabilistic concept. Ultimately, they should help 
foster a reflexive and humble attitude towards development.    
This dissertation illustrates how a novel conceptual framework for uncertainty analysis, 
the Walker & Harremoës (W&H) framework, can be applied. The W&H integrated 
uncertainty analysis framework synthesizes a variety of scholarly contributions on 
uncertainty, in order to provide an interdisciplinary theoretical framework for 
systematic uncertainty analysis. Uncertainty is broadly defined as being any deviation 
from the unachievable ideal of completely deterministic knowledge of the relevant 
system. The framework distinguishes between three fundamental dimensions of 
uncertainty: the location, level and nature of uncertainty.    
The W&H framework was applied to analyse two case studies related to the risk 
assessment of genetically modified crops:  i) the risk of developing “super weeds” 
through the use of herbicide tolerant rapeseed; and ii) the phenomena of transgene 
silencing.  As the experts involved were not familiar with the W&H framework, expert 
elicitations were used to communicate the W&H framework to the experts in such a 
way that their knowledge of uncertainty was obtained, without them being overly 
intimidated or confused by the novelty of the concepts they were presented with. 
1 Throughout this dissertation, the terms “precautionary paradigm” are used to designate an approach and 
way of thinking, rather than a specific legal practice related to the Precautionary Principle. 
vThe results obtained indicate that, not withstanding efforts to clarify the relationships 
between the concepts put forth in the W&H framework, experts did not use these 
concepts consistently.  Nonetheless, the approach was successful in making explicit 
levels of uncertainty deeper than the statistical uncertainty commonly reported.  As is 
the case for the concept of “risk”, different people will have different (subjective) 
perspectives on the concept of “uncertainty”.  The approach successfully revealed that 
there are a variety of perspectives on the uncertainty that characterizes the cases 
studied.  Thus, although the results yielded by studies such as the ones presented here 
may seem ambiguous, they are a valuable contribution to the discussion of the quality 
of the information underlying regulatory decisions.    
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Usikkerhed i videnskab med politisk relevans - Resumé 
Ingeniører og videnskaber fungerer – ud over som leverandører af den fornødne ekspert viden 
og tekniske know-how til offentlige organer – som en vigtig kilde til legitimering af lovindgreb. 
Ifølge den gældende liberale filosofi bør de lovgivende autoriteter kun gribe ind i tilfælde, hvor 
udviklingen kan have skadelige konsekvenser. Deres beslutninger bør hvile på fakta, der ideelt 
set vurderes inden for rammen af en ren rationel metode – som fx risikovurdering – så man 
herigennem sikrer, at tolkningen af de foreliggende data bliver så objektiv som muligt. Dette 
kan være problematisk i situationer, hvor den videnskabelige viden er begrænset, de 
tilgængelige data usikre, indsatsen høj og de involverede værdier er i konflikt. 
I mange tilfælde er de lov relaterede emner, som forskere og ingeniører bliver bedt om at 
behandle, langt mere komplekse end dem, der typisk optræder i laboratoriet. Den eksisterende 
viden er ofte begrænset, og dataene usikre. Den populære fællesbetegnelse ‘usikkerhed’ dækker 
reelt over vigtige tekniske skel. Det veletablerede usikkerhedsbegreb udelader – når det 
benyttes kun som et statistisk eller sandsynlighedsberegnende begreb – vigtige aspekter af den 
usikkerhed, man møder i behandlingen af komplekse lovmæssige problemer: fx den 
usikkerhed, der opstår som et resultat af formodninger og af ignorering af årsag - 
virkningsforhold.  
Det her benyttede forsigtighedsparadigme er opstået som en konsekvens af de ovenstående 
erkendelser. I paradigmet er forskeres og ingeniørers rolle at deltage i den kollektive indsats for 
at producere, evaluere og anvende viden, vurdere de berørte interesser og træffe en beslutning, 
der i sin natur må være bundet af sin kontekst. Formelle metoder er nødvendige for at beskrive 
usikkerhed, og disse metoder må bevæge sig ud over definitionen af usikkerhed som et 
statistisk eller sandsynlighedsberegnende begreb. I sidste ende skulle de gerne afføde en 
refleksiv og ydmyg tilgang til udvikling. 
Denne afhandling illustrerer, hvordan et nyt begrebsapparat for usikkerhedsanalyse, the Walker 
& Harremoës (W&H) framework, kan anvendes. Dette begrebsapparat sammenfatter et udvalg 
af videnskabelige behandlinger af usikkerhed for herigennem at skabe et tværfagligt, teoretisk 
metoderedskab for systematisk usikkerhedsanalyse. Usikkerhed defineres breds som enhver 
afvigelse fra det uopnåelige ideal for totalt determinérbar viden omkring det pågældende 
system. W & H-begrebsapparatet skelner mellem tre grundlæggende dimensioner af 
usikkerhed: usikkerhedens lokalitet, niveau og art.
W&H-begrebsapparatet blev anvendt til at analysere to feltarbejder med relation til 
risikovurderingen af genetisk modificerede afgrøder: i) risikoen for at udvikle ‘super-ukrudt’ 
gennem brugen af sprøjtegift tolerante rapsfrø og ii) risikoen for ’transgenic silencing’. 
Eftersom de involverede eksperter ikke var bekendt med W&H-begrebsapparatet, blev 
interview benyttet til at kommunikere begrebsapparatet til eksperterne på en måde, så deres 
viden om usikkerhed blev bevaret uden unødig irritation eller forvirring i forhold til nyheden af 
begreber, de blev præsenteret for.  
De opnåede resultater indikerer – undtaget indsatsen for at klarlægge forholdet mellem de 
fremsatte begreber i W&H-apparatet – at eksperterne ikke benyttede disse begreber 
konsekvent. Ikke desto mindre resulterede deres tilgang i en fordybelse og forankring af 
eksplicitte usikkerhedsniveauer i forhold til den traditionelle statistiske usikkerhed. Ligesom 
det gælder begrebet ‘risiko’, vil forskellige mennesker have forskellige (subjektive) definitioner 
af begrebet ‘usikkerhed’. Forskernes tilgang afslørede, at der eksisterer et udvalg af 
perspektiver på den usikkerhed, som karakteriserer de behandlede emner. Selv om resultaterne 
af forsøg som dem, der her er blevet foretaget, kan virke tvetydige, udgør de således et 
værdifuldt bidrag til diskussionen om kvaliteten af den information, der udgør grundlaget for 
regulative beslutninger.
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11  The case for conducting in-depth  
uncertainty analysis in policy relevant science 
1.1  Introduction 
Over the past 150 years, technology has had a profound impact on society.  The 
internet, computers and cellular phones are just a few recent examples of the wide 
variety of technological innovations produced by natural scientists and engineers that 
have dramatically changed the day-to-day lifestyle of people in industrialised countries.  
However, the development of technology is not the only function of scientists and 
engineers in modern society. Unfortunately, technological development has been 
accompanied by a number of unexpected, adverse impacts on human health and on the 
environment.  Because of their knowledge and skills, natural scientists and engineers 
are intimately involved in the regulatory process put in place by society to manage 
technological development and minimize its adverse side-effects.   
This chapter argues that, given their role in the regulatory decision making process and 
the complexity of the problems they are often called upon to study, it is incumbent 
upon scientists and engineers involved in policy relevant science to communicate the 
uncertainty characterizing their assessments.  Information about uncertainty contributes 
to the basis for deliberation on the precautionary measures warranted and the general 
desirability of technological innovations.  It is also useful in informing adaptive 
decision making.  Ultimately, uncertainty assessment should contribute to increasing 
reflexivity in the decision making process.  
1.2 Scientists and engineers as policy advisers 
1.2.1 A brief historical perspective 
The origin of modern western thought can be traced back to what is known as the 
Enlightenment, a European intellectual movement of the 17th and 18th centuries.  One 
of the major changes brought about by the Enlightenment was the displacement of the 
Church by science as the authoritative source of knowledge about man and nature.   
The ideas of the early scientists Copernicus (1473-1543), Descartes (1596-1650) and 
Newton (1642-1727) were particularly instrumental in precipitating this change.  
Copernicus argued that the Earth revolved around the Sun, which at the time was a 
shocking theory because it contradicted the view that was presented in the Bible, 
according to which the Earth is at the center of creation and the Sun hangs from a 
celestial ceiling.  If Copernicus was right, then the Bible could no longer be taken as a 
reliable source of knowledge. Scientific beliefs about the world would then need to be 
gathered in a radically new way.  Descartes was instrumental in establishing how this 
should be done, calling for a methodological examination of knowledge before the 
“forum of Reason”.  Descartes believed that all material bodies, including the human 
body, are machines that operate by mechanical principles. Through Reason, man could 
understand these principles and use this understanding to improve his own condition.  
The new “scientific method” formulated by Descartes established procedures through 
2which Reason could be applied to acquire knowledge that was free from arbitrary and 
unfounded or superstitious assumptions. Following this, the success of Newton in 
describing the laws that govern the motions of the planets in simple mathematical 
equations (his three laws of motion and his principle of universal gravitation) greatly 
bolstered man’s confidence in his capacity to attain knowledge.  Thus, by the end of 
the 18th century, science had replaced the Church as the chief source of man’s 
understanding of the universe.   
Between 1750 and the early 1900s, the technological innovations of the Industrial 
Revolution made it possible to greatly increase the transformation of natural resources 
and the mass production of manufactured goods.  These innovations included the use of 
new raw materials (e.g. iron and steel), the use of new energy sources (e.g. coal, steam, 
petroleum and electricity), the advent of the factory system, and important 
developments in transportation and communication (e.g. steam locomotive, 
automobile, telegraph and radio).  
The Industrial Revolution was accompanied by broad social changes such as the 
growth of cities and the explosion of urban populations. The problem of drinking water 
treatment received widespread public attention following the discovery that the London 
cholera epidemic of 1854 was due to a contaminated public well. Cholera epidemics 
forced most of Europe’s cities to develop the means of providing clean drinking water 
and sanitation services to their populations.  It was soon recognized that in order to deal 
with the many changes taking place in society, public officials possessing specialized 
technical knowledge were required.  Thus, natural scientists and engineers became 
involved in the management of technological development.  Before long, governments 
at all levels relied on scientists and engineers to occupy important positions within the 
civil service.   
Two themes emerge from the brief historical account above.  The first is that following 
the Enlightenment, scientists and engineers came to be regarded as the authoritative 
source of knowledge in society.  When religion came to be perceived as being based on 
beliefs and superstitions, science came to be perceived as being unbiased and factual, 
the unique bearer of the True and therefore the Good.  The second central theme is that 
scientists and engineers have become firmly anchored in the fabric of society.  Through 
their research activities and their activities in the civil service, scientists and engineers 
function as both the source of technological innovation, and as key participants in the 
management of this technological innovation.     
1.2.2 The involvement of science in the policy process
The broadening scope of technological applications, coupled with increasing public 
concern over the impacts of these technologies, led to the establishment of the modern 
regulatory agencies we know today (e.g. Environmental Protection Agencies).  Because 
of their knowledge and skills, a myriad of different scientists and engineers are 
involved in the regulatory process.  Some scientists and engineers are employed within 
the agencies themselves and perform the specialized tasks associated with the activities 
of the agency.  Others are employed outside the agency (e.g. in industry, consulting or 
academia), but act as advisers to the agency in situations where important regulatory 
decisions must be made concerning issues where scientific expertise is required.   
3The function of these scientists and engineers is to provide decision makers with 
scientific assessments upon which to base their decisions.  An important goal of the 
regulatory process is to ensure that the health of the public and the environment are 
protected from the potential side-effects of technology.  Thus, in many cases, the 
subject of scientific assessments is a matter of public interest, such as minimising the 
risks posed by chemicals to human health and the environment.  Examples of 
frequently encountered assessment methods are risk assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis.   
The function of scientific advisers is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  The Figure presents an 
idealized model of the decision making process (OXERA, 2000). The model 
distinguishes four different roles in the decision making process: the decision maker, 
the policy maker, the scientific adviser and the stakeholder representative. Their 
respective functions can be described as follows:        
x Decision maker – a person with the authority to take a policy decision. 
This may be a government Minister, or a person or body with the delegated 
authority to take a decision in the name of a Minister. 
x Policy maker – a person or organization charged with assisting a decision 
taker in reaching a decision by providing policy analysis or generating 
policy options.   
x Scientific advisor – a person or organization responsible for providing 
scientific input to policy-making or decision making, whether from within 
or outside the civil service. This includes both scientists expert in narrow 
disciplines relevant to the problem in question, and broader-based scientists 
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Figure. 1.1  Model of the regulatory process (adapted from OXERA, 2000). 
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4able to integrate several disciplines.  
x Stakeholder representative – a person or organization representing the 
interests and opinions of a group with an interest in the outcome of a 
particular policy decision. 
The term “decision support ” is used to describe the type of scientific activity 
conducted by Scientific Advisers.  Throughout this dissertation, this type of activity is 
at times designated as policy relevant science, decision support sciences, or regulatory 
sciences.  Decision support sciences can be thought of as structured search processes 
that aim to provide knowledge that facilitates decision/ policy making (van Asselt, 
2000).  A number of different assessment approaches can be characterized as decision 
support, amongst which some commonly employed methods are environmental impact 
assessment, life-cycle analysis, ecological and health risk assessment, technical risk 
analysis, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). 
1.2.3 The liberal foundation of the regulatory system  
Although the management of technological developments requires the expert 
knowledge and technical know-how possessed by scientists and engineers, the 
necessity of involving scientists and engineers in the regulatory process is more 
profound than this pragmatic requirement may suggest.  To understand the role of 
science in the modern regulatory process, it is useful to consider some of the basic 
principles upon which it is based.   
One of the founding principles of the modern regulatory process is the liberal principle 
of state neutrality.  According to traditional liberalism, the state should be neutral with 
regards to particular attitudes and values, that is, conceptions of the good. Such 
conceptions are seen as private rather than public matters, and the law is supposed not 
to favour any particular conception. On the contrary, values are deemed to be 
illegitimate as justification for political action.  Rather than being based on values, 
decisions should stem from a rational consideration of the facts.  Thus, science is 
invested in the regulatory process in order to provide an impartial source of facts upon 
which policy decisions can be based.   
A second founding principle of the regulatory system, the harm principle, was 
formulated more than a hundred years ago by John Stuart Mill.  It basically states that 
persons should be free to do whatever they like, unless their activities are harmful to 
others. The principle was originally intended to protect individual freedom in matters 
of, for instance, religion and sexuality.  Today, the principle is applied to many areas of 
regulation, including regulations on the application of new technologies.  
The influence of the principle of state neutrality and the harm principle is to create a 
requirement for facts about harm.  Harm is the trigger for regulatory intervention, and 
only facts can determine the existence of this harm.  In practice, this means that in order 
to justify regulatory intervention, “threats” should be defined in as specific terms as 
possible and ideally in quantitative form.  The basis for action should be a factual one, 
ideally developed through the use of a rigorous rational methodology (e.g. risk 
assessment) to ensure that the interpretation of the facts is the most objective possible 
(Fisher, 2005).   
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most legitimate grounds for disagreement is to prove (or claim) the harmfulness of the 
enterprise in question.  In other words, to be effective, opposition must be expressed in 
terms of risk, the existence of which is to be demonstrated using science (Jensen et al.,
2003; Meyer et al., 2005).  As will be explained further on, this can be quite 
problematic in situations where scientific knowledge is limited, facts are uncertain, 
stakes are high and values are conflicting. 
1.3 Complexity 
An important distinction between decision support sciences and conventional sciences 
lies in the complexity of the problems studied.  Conventional sciences tend to focus on 
isolated systems under controlled circumstances.  Decision support sciences must often 
deal with real world problems, the complexity of which far exceeds the complexity of 
the problems typically studied in conventional sciences. This realisation has lead to the 
designation of a new class of problems, complex problems, which includes issues such 
as global climate change, chemical pollution and stratospheric ozone depletion.   
Complex problems are characterized by one or more of the following properties 
(adapted from NRC, 1988; van Asselt, 2000; Funtowicz et al., 1999; Holling, 2001; 
UNESCO, 2005): 
x There is not one problem, but a tangled web of related problems; 
x The underlying processes interact with one another within some sort of 
hierarchy; 
x The dynamics of the systems studied are not necessarily regular, but are 
characterized by synergistic and/or antagonistic relationships, indirect 
relationships, long delay periods between cause and effect, thresholds or 
non-linear behaviours; 
x The issue lies across or at the intersection of many disciplines, i.e., it       
has economic, environmental, socio-cultural and political                       
dimensions; 
x There are a number of different, equally legitimate and plausible, 
perspectives on how the problem should be conceived.  
The hierarchical relationships encountered in complex systems may be hierarchies of 
inclusion and scale, as in a watershed that includes streams, ponds, rivers, lakes and the 
sea, at ascending levels. Alternatively, they may be hierarchies of function, as in an 
organism that is comprised of a number of separate organs, each performing a function 
subordinate to the overall function of the organism, which itself may be sub-ordinate to 
the overall function of an ecosystem. Environmental systems may also include human 
and institutional sub-systems, which are themselves systems.   
In complex systems, causes and effects are not always obviously related.  Pushing on a 
complex system "here" often has effects "over there" because the parts are indirectly 
dependent of one another. Similarly, the future conditions in a complex system may not 
always follow closely on the conditions in the past.  When a particular threshold is 
exceeded, the system can abruptly shift away from a period of relative stability in one 
state, to another, fundamentally different state.  An example is that of the impacts of 
climate change on thermohalyne circulation, the large-scale ocean circulation that 
currently transports heat from the mid-latitudes to the high latitudes. Geological 
6analysis and model experiments suggest that these currents can be on or off, and that 
the two states are characterized by drastically different environmental conditions in 
Western Europe (Broeker, 1997; Cusbasch et al., 2001).  Similar dramatic regime shifts 
have now been documented for a wide range of environmental systems (Scheffer et al.,
2001; Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003). 
Because of the hierarchical, indirect, synergistic and non-linear relationships that can 
characterize complex systems, any attempts at reductionist analysis will be inherently 
incomplete.  The concepts used to represent the functionings of the system will 
necessarily be rough approximations.  The empirical data required may not be 
available, or may only be available in a form that requires interpreting or massaging to 
make it relevant to the problem at hand.  Thus, in addition to the obvious uncertainties 
resulting from the operations of data collection and aggregation, the analysis will be 
characterized by deeper, structural uncertainties, not amenable to quantitative analysis.  
Similarly, every analyst of a complex system will operate at a certain level in the 
hierarchy of the system, with certain observational and analytical tools, and with certain 
prior experiences. The result of their separate observations and analyses are not at all 
arbitrary; but none of them can singly encompass the whole system. There is no unique, 
more plausible or more legitimate approach through which to analyse the system. The 
choice of which analysis approach to use is therefore value-laden.  The values involved 
are those embodied in the societal or institutional system in which the science is being 
done.
An approach inherent to conventional sciences is that of reductionism, whereby an 
overall system is understood as an assembly of sub-systems.  By studying and 
understanding each of the sub-systems, an understanding of the overall system is 
achieved.  While the reductionist approach has led to many great achievements in 
Western science, the properties of complex problems, explained in more detail below,  
greatly reduce the effectiveness of the approach.  Systems that are complex are not 
merely complicated; by their nature they involve deep uncertainties and a plurality of 
legitimate perspectives.  Thus, rational, reductionist approaches to analyzing risks, such 
as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, will have only limited value.  
Funtowicz et al. (1999) have illustrated the challenges related to the analysis of 
complex systems using the Hindu parable of the six blind men touching an elephant.  
One blind man touched the side of the elephant and said it was a wall.  Another blind 
man touched the ear and said it was a large leaf of a tree.  Yet another blind man was 
holding a leg and thought it was a tree trunk.  Still another blind man took hold of the 
elephant’s trunk and said it was a snake.  Someone else was touching the elephant’s 
tusk and believed it was a spear. Another blind man had the elephant’s tail in his hand 
and was calling it a rope.  All of the blind men were touching the same reality but were 
understanding it differently.  Each conceived the object on the basis of his own partial 
imagination process, but none of them could visualise the whole elephant.  Only an 
outsider possessing the sense of sight was able to visualise the whole elephant.  
Similarly, in science, a number of different experts, each from a different discipline, 
may produce a number of different analysis of a complex system.  While each of these 
analyses may be a correct partial description, they fall short of a holistic grasp of the 
system.  Although a truly holistic grasp will always remain unachievable, policy 
relevant science must strive to integrate partial views into a richer view of the whole.   
71.4 Policy relevant science 
Since the 1960’s, the social dimensions of science have increasingly become a subject 
of study by philosophers, sociologists and historians of science.  One of the central 
themes that have emerged from these studies has been a strong critic of the view of 
science as the provider of the objective truth.  Following the publication of the seminal 
work by Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962), it became 
increasingly apparent that rather than being the result of value-neutral, dispassionate 
observations, scientific knowledge is constructed and negotiated according to a social 
process.  That which is considered acceptable or unacceptable as knowledge is largely 
determined by negotiations within the scientific community  (Kuhn, 1962; Knorr-
Cetina & Mulkay, 1983; Latour & Woolgar, 1986).  These negotiations are influenced 
by social factors such as rhetoric, politics, and personal reputations.  Because of this, 
scientific conclusions, or the `truth´ perceived, will depend on the actors and 
circumstances involved, and are therefore not definitive accounts of the physical world. 
Rather, they are social constructions which may evolve as circumstances change.   
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) were amongst the first scholars to interpret the 
constructivist paradigm described above in terms of policy relevant science.  They 
introduced the term “post-normal science” to designate science conducted in contexts 
of high political pressure, large decision stakes, disputed values and pervasive 
uncertainty. The scientific nature of decision support activities derives from the fact 
that they are conducted in a structured, methodological way. However, while the results 
of conventional science most often serve to increase understanding of the natural 
universe or to contribute to technological advancement, the results of decision support 
are used to facilitate decision making in the policy process.  In this context, the leading 
scientific problems are no longer derived from abstracted scientific curiosity or 
industrial imperatives.  Rather, the research agenda for decision support sciences is set 
in the context of complex policy problems.  Typically in such contexts, political and 
ethical considerations influence how the problem is defined, which research questions 
are to be given priority, and often which research groups should be mandated to 
investigate the problem.  Thus, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990), Wynne (1992) and others 
(e.g. see Krimsky & Golding, 1992; Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998) argue that decision 
support sciences are particularly prone to the “subjective pitfalls” highlighted by social 
constructivism. Rather than “hard” facts and “soft” values, decision support sciences 
should be considered “soft” sciences providing the basis for “hard” decisions.   
Funtowicz (2004) proposed that there are (at least) two different visions of the relation 
between science and decision making in policy processes, which he labels as “modern” 
and “precautionary”.   
1.4.1 The modern vision of the science-policy interface 
To a large extent, the vision of science that emerged following the Enlightenment, 
which is of science as a special and higher form of knowledge, the provider of objective 
facts about the natural world, still underlies the modern paradigm for science conducted 
at the science-policy interface.  
8In the modern paradigm, policy should follow from the consideration of objective 
scientific facts.  This vision is “reductionist”, in that it understands the world in terms 
of component parts that allow for abstracting the part from the whole, as well as 
increasingly specialized knowledge of each component part  The result of this “logic of 
component thinking” is a view of the world which is referred to as “technocratic”, 
according to which the world is perceived as a system that can be technically 
redesigned in ways that make it more efficient and controllable.  Typically, technocrats 
tend to see technical solutions as applicable to most social and cultural situations 
(Fischer, 2000).  Problem solving, in short, is reduced to a technical matter of plugging 
solutions into different social contexts.  In addition to being reductionist and 
technocratic, the modern paradigm can also be characterized as “positivistic”, in that it 
accepts a separation of facts and values (Proctor, 1991), claiming that empirical 
research can and should be conducted without normative (value-dependant) references, 
and viewing uncertainty as a temporary and resolvable certainty deficit.  In the modern 
paradigm, the role of science is to speak truth to power (Wildavsky, 1979).  
1.4.2 The precautionary vision of the science-policy interface 
The precautionary paradigm holds that through complex issues such as water 
management, climate change and endocrine disruptors, it has become apparent that in 
many cases, complete knowledge or ‘truth’ is not achievable.  In such cases, there are 
relatively few simple 'facts' upon which decisions can be based.  While numerical 
models are often used to investigate complex systems, the properties of such systems, 
the intricacies of modeling and the lack of transparency in complicated models imply 
that assessments involve value-laden problem definitions and assumptions. 
Assessments of policy problems involve uncertainties of many sorts, including 
irreducible lack of knowledge and ignorance. Within the precautionary paradigm, 
scientific knowledge is perceived as socially constructed to some extent, in that it 
necessarily offers an account of the physical world that is mediated through social 
processes; and that it therefore cannot be considered definitive.  Scientific conclusions 
are claims that have been deemed to be adequate by a specific group of actors in a 
particular cultural and social context.  Scientific assessments may facilitate decision 
making, but their conclusions cannot be defended with reference to objectivity and 
neutrality. Problem framing and the identification of relevant scientific disciplines and 
knowledge resources are political decisions.  In the precautionary paradigm, uncertainty 
is a phenomenon inherent to science, which should be recognized and taken into 
consideration in the decision making process.   
As will be seen below, the precautionary paradigm has been crystallised in more 
definite terms within the debate surrounding the Precautionary Principle.   
1.5 The Precautionary Principle 
To a significant degree, the environmental “surprises” witnessed in the past 50 years 
have been due to disregarded knowledge, uncertainty or ignorance (Harremoës et al.,
2001). Too frequently, the growing innovative powers of science seem to outstrip its 
ability to predict the consequences of its applications. At the same time, the scale of 
human interventions in nature increases the chances that hazardous impacts may be 
9both serious and global.  Therefore, the Precautionary Principle has been proposed to 
guide decision making in situations of high uncertainty and potentially large-scale, 
irreversible impacts.
A central conclusion of the European Environmental Agency report on the 
Precautionary Principle (Harremoës et al., 2001) concerns the importance of 
recognizing and fully understanding the nature and limitations of scientific knowledge. 
No matter how sophisticated knowledge is, it will always be subject to some degree of 
uncertainty and ignorance.  By their nature, complex problems have traditionally been 
inadequately addressed in the decision making process, and that which is commonly 
referred to under the umbrella term ‘uncertainty’ actually hides important technical 
distinctions.  Engineers and scientists are taught at an early stage how common 
problems such as sampling errors and imprecise measurements generate uncertainty in 
experimental results, and how this uncertainty can be dealt with using statistical 
methods. However, this well-established approach to uncertainty analysis leaves out 
many important aspects of the uncertainty encountered when assessing complex policy 
problems (ESTO, 2001).  
The regulatory process can at times be the stage of bitter disputes amongst 
stakeholders, all of whom are trying to steer the process in a direction that best serves 
their particular interests.  Proponents of potentially harmful activities often tend to use 
uncertainty as an argument for postponing or waiving regulation (Michaels & 
Monforton, forthcoming; Michaels, 2005).  They demand certain knowledge about the 
harm caused, as well as about the cause-effect relationship leading to the harm, to 
justify the need for regulation.  Such a strategic behaviour towards uncertainty is not 
only observed among the defenders of business interests, but also among NGO’s and 
other interest groups (Jasanoff, 1994; Fischer, 2000). While striving to ensure 
transparency and consistency in decision making, regulators themselves often become 
trapped in a quest for certainty (van Asselt and Vos, 2005).  Experience demonstrates 
that often, conclusive evidence of harm only becomes available once harm has been 
done (Harremoës et al., 2001). In many cases, the politicisation of uncertainty (i.e., 
emphasizing or amplifying uncertainty to serve a specific interest) paralyses the 
environmental management process (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Michaels, 2005), a 
particularly undesirable outcome when the consequences of regulatory inaction could 
lead to irreversible harm.  
There is no universally accepted definition of the Precautionary Principle.  Gee and 
Krayer von Krauss (2005) present one formulation of the principle stating that it  
“provides justification for public policy actions in 
situations of scientific complexity, uncertainty and 
ignorance, where there may be a need to act in 
order to avoid, or reduce, potentially serious or 
irreversible threats to health or the environment, 
using an appropriate level of scientific evidence, 
and taking into account the likely pros and cons of 
action and inaction”.
This formulation does not clarify who has the burden of proving absence or presence of 
threats of harm, nor how or who is to determine the appropriateness of the level of 
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scientific evidence.  Another reading of the precautionary principle (Rogers, 2003) 
holds that  
“the proponent of an activity posing uncertain risk 
bears the burden of proving that the activity poses 
“no” or an “acceptable” risk before the activity 
can go forward”.
1.6 The precautionary paradigm revisited 
Two themes emerge from the above statements of the Precautionary Principle: one 
concerns the generation (and presentation) of policy relevant scientific knowledge 
including its uncertainty, while the other concerns the application of (uncertain and 
perhaps even partisan) scientific knowledge in political, regulatory and judicial 
decision making processes (Krayer von Krauss et al., 2005).  In view of further 
articulating the precautionary paradigm, it is useful to consider the insights generated 
within three bodies of literature:  i) the literature on deliberative decision making, ii) 
the literature on adaptive management, and iii) the literature on reflexivity.    
1.6.1 Deliberative decision making 
One of the profound implications of the Precautionary paradigm is its bearing on the 
legitimacy of regulatory decisions.  In a system where regulators are meant to be the 
value-neutral administrators who base all of their decisions on facts, what may justify 
regulatory interventions and what kinds of interventions are justifiable, in situations 
where the facts are uncertain?  The problem is that this is the case with nearly all 
environmental and public health issues, which leads to a situation where regulators 
cannot act, and/or a façade of objectivity is constructed to justify action.  The challenge 
is thus to conceive the regulatory process in a way that ensures the ability of regulators 
to act in an open and accountable manner in situations of uncertainty.  In response to 
this challenge, many scholars argue for a regulatory decision making process where 
deliberation amongst actors plays a central role (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; NRC, 
1996; RCEP, 1998; Fischer, 2000; ESTO, 2001; Wynne, 2001; Klinke & Renn, 2002; 
Harremoës et al., 2001, Fisher, 2005).   
Deliberative decision making aims to achieve a synthesis of scientific expertise and 
public values on a specific issue.  Here, the notion of the “threat” that justifies 
regulatory intervention is interpreted broadly, such that there is no pre-defined or 
precise definition of the acceptability nor the nature of the risk (Fisher, 2005).  The 
legitimacy of regulatory decisions is restored through an increased democratisation of 
decision making, whereby a variety of actors, representing as wide a spectrum of 
perspectives as possible, are invited to participate in the decision making process.  
Here, conflicts are resolved in consultation rather than in confrontation (Webler, 1995; 
Jasanoff, 1994).   
While deliberative decision making processes begin with the consideration of scientific 
inputs (i.e., risk assessments), this is only one activity in a more complex evaluation 
procedure.  The scientific inputs are subsequently brought into a deliberative arena for 
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debate in a wide forum which includes stakeholders and public interest groups in 
addition to scientists and decision makers.  Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) designate this 
process as extended peer review.  The expectation is that the participants in the debate 
(i.e., the extended peers) will introduce additional factors to the decision making 
process.  There are no methods or guidelines pre-determining which factors should 
serve as the basis for decision making, and these will vary from one context to another.  
The ambition is to create a synergistic process, whereby deliberation generates a body 
of considerations that is richer than that which would be generated if each of the 
stakeholders simply put forth their considerations individually, without reflecting on 
those of others. In other words, the relevant aspects of a decision will co-evolve as they 
are considered (Fisher, 2005).   
It is not possible to provide general guidance as to what should form the basis of a 
deliberative decision. In nearly all circumstances, science will be an important 
consideration (Stirling, 2001), but other factors may also be relevant.  Such factors may 
include extended facts (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992), i.e., information stakeholders and 
laypersons possess on the extent and nature of the risk.  Examples of extended facts 
include anecdotes circulated verbally, edited collections of such materials prepared by 
citizens’ groups and the media, the experiences of persons with a deep knowledge of a 
particular environment and its problems, or the materials discovered by investigative 
journalism.   
While the training and employment of experts can socialise them to abstract, 
generalized conceptions, those whose livelihoods depend on the problem will have a 
keen awareness of how general principles are realised in their backyards.  The 
traditional, intuitive and particularized knowledge the affected lay people possess gives 
them a firmer grounding in real world operational conditions. Often, too, their 
knowledge may be based on different perceptions about what is salient, or what degree 
of control is reasonable to expect or require, whereas the knowledge of technical 
specialists may simply be based on the common practice, without further reflection.  
Thus, in addition to contributing to the formulation of policy problems, local 
knowledge can also help determine which data, models and assumptions are relevant in 
particular cases.   
One prominent example of a contribution from lay knowledge relevant to the 
regulatory process concerns workplace awareness of emerging patterns of ill health 
(Harremoës et al., 2001).  The histories of usage of asbestos (Gee & Greenberg, 2001) 
and PCBs (Koppe & Keys, 2001) provide examples where workers were aware of what 
regulators subsequently recognised to be a serious problem. Similarly, local 
communities may become aware of unusual concentrations of ill health before the 
authorities, as occurred in the Love Canal case (Gilbertson, 2001).   
In addition to extended facts, lay people and stakeholders can raise a number of ethical 
considerations that are relevant to the decision making process. These may include 
different perspectives on the acceptability of risk in the face of uncertainty, issues of 
fairness and environmental justice, visions on future technological developments and 
societal change, and preferences about desirable lifestyles and community life.  While 
the extended facts provided by stakeholders and lay people may broaden the factual 
basis for decision making, it is the process of including their additional perspectives 
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and values that legitimizes the decisions made in the face of complexity and 
uncertainty.   
An important reflection on deliberative approaches is that public preferences do not 
necessarily match the real interests of the public since the preferences are clouded by 
misinformation, biases, and limited experience (Klinke & Renn, 2002).  Of course, the 
input provided by stakeholders and lay persons should be subjected to the same 
intensity of critical scrutiny as specialist expertise (Harremoës et al., 2001).  Just like 
expert knowledge, lay knowledge can be uncertain, partial, biased etc...  Simply 
organizing a platform for mutual exchange of ideas, arguments, and concerns does not 
suffice to ensure fair and competent policies (Renn, 1999).  Mixing all of these 
knowledge and value sources creates the danger that subjective perceptions supersede 
factual assessments, or that the rhetoric of powerful actors dominates the input of less 
powerful and organised actors, who may be those who must bear the risks.  This has 
given rise to a growing number of formal methods to conduct deliberative decision 
making.  Common to all of these methods is the aim to ensure that the contributions of 
different actors are embedded in a dialogue setting that guarantees mutual exchange of 
arguments and information, provides all participants with opportunities to insert and 
challenge claims, and creates an active understanding amongst all participants 
(Forester, 1999; Fischer, 2000). Examples of such methods and approaches include 
multi-criteria analysis (Jansson, 2001; Stirling & Mayer, 2001), constructive 
technology assessment (Rip et al., 1996), technical options analysis (Ashford 1991; 
Tickner, 2000), consensus conferences and scenario workshops (Andersen & Jæger, 
1999), cooperative discourse (Renn, 1999) and participatory policy analysis (Fischer, 
2003).
1.6.2 Adaptive management 
The basic idea of adaptive management - implementing policies as experiments – first 
emerged in the 1970s and 80s in the field of natural resource management (Holling 
1978, Walters 1986).  Adaptive management is grounded in the admission that humans 
do not know enough to manage ecosystems. Thus, adaptive management formulates 
management policies as experiments that probe the responses of (eco)systems as 
people's behaviour in them changes.  Rather than thinking of ecosystem management 
as the task of managing nature, adaptive management aims to manage the people who 
interact with the ecosystem (Lee, 1999). In practice, it was proposed that this vision be 
enacted by developing computerised models, preferably using the best available inter-
disciplinary knowledge, by using these models to test the impact of different policy 
measures, and by identifying key uncertainties in the models.  These uncertainties 
could then be explored by conducting focused, large-scale management experiments in 
the field which, through monitoring efforts, would directly reveal the impacts of the 
policies tested, at the space and time scales where future resource management would 
actually occur, and the experience gained could then be applied on a large scale 
(Walters, 1997).   
Adaptive management implies a change in the way uncertainty is perceived.  In 
adaptive management, science and knowledge are considered intrinsically uncertain, 
and it is accepted that regulatory decisions must therefore be made in a context of 
uncertainty (Walker et al., 2001).  Thus, information about uncertainty is used 
proactively, as a resource in the decision making process.  The goal of the policy 
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experiments is to learn something about the ecosystem's processes and structures, in 
view of designing better policies and experiments. Because ignorance of ecosystems is 
uneven, management policies should be chosen in light of the assumptions they aim to 
test, so that the most important uncertainties are tested rigorously and early (Lee, 
1999).
Although adaptive management has been applied in many different contexts, to date, it 
has been much more influential as an idea than as a practice.  Experience has shown 
that there are many human and institutional barriers that can hinder the proper 
implementation of adaptive management.  For example, the complexity of the 
ecosystems and human behaviour implies that causal understanding is likely to emerge 
slowly (i.e., over several years). However, policy formulation is often driven by 
relatively short funding and election cycles, thereby making it difficult to treat long-
term crises in the natural world effectively.  In some cases, agency professionals may 
view admission of uncertainty as an admission of weakness (Gunderson et al., 1995).  
It can be very difficult to convince people who adopt such views that they will gain 
more credibility by openly admitting uncertainty, and then suggesting proactive ways 
of dealing with that uncertainty.   
1.6.3 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is a concept that has been central to social scientific thought since the 
1990s, after the writings of authors such as Beck, Giddens and Lash on modernity, risk 
and the cultural dimensions of contemporary environmental issues (Beck, 1992; 
Giddens, 1991; Beck et al., 1994; Lash et al., 1996).  Beck introduced the term 
"reflexive modernization" to designate a new stage of development which, according to 
him and others, society has entered.  This new era is characterized by a change in the 
way society perceives its relation to the risks to which it is subjected.  In the previous 
era, known as “modernity”, society was exposed to risks generated by external factors 
such as nature, which society responded to by developing technologies to overcome 
risks and increase welfare.  In the current era of reflexive modernization, the principle 
risks to which society is exposed are no longer generated by nature, but by society 
itself:  it is the  unintended side-effects of technological development that currently 
pose the greatest threat to our welfare.  Rather than  producing ever-increasing security 
and welfare for people, industrial society has come to produce ever-greater risks for 
people and the environment.   
The notion of reflexive modernization has led to calls for the development of 
institutions and approaches to decision making that foster reflexivity in the regulatory 
context (Hajer, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2001). The extent to which a decision-making process 
can be considered reflexive hinges upon the ability of the policy community to 
recognize the limitations of the knowledge base underpinning a decision, draw upon 
the collective knowledge and experience of the past to design a policy, monitor and 
assess the effects of this policy, and adjust the policy accordingly.  In this sense, 
reflexivity implies both “reflex” and “reflection” (Craye et al., 2005).  Reflex in 
reference to the response of society to the unintended consequences of technological 
development. Reflection in reference to the careful consideration of the limitations of 
the information available, the diversity of viewpoints, and the multiplicity of possible 
policy options.   
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The rationale here is that the best way to cope with the reflexivity of the modernization 
process is to increase the reflexivity of the decision making process.  In other words, 
expect surprises, seek them out, and deal with them as they arise.  Reflexive decision 
making will require the actors of the policy community to change their attitude towards 
uncertainty, conflict and decision making. A pro-active attitude which recognises and 
accounts for uncertainty is required, and conflict must be perceived as a learning 
opportunity rather than as a battle to be fought and won.   
In a reflexive policy community, conflict is treated as an important catalyst to 
reflection.  Conflict may lie in the discrepancy between one’s vision of the ideal and 
one’s perception of reality, or in the discrepancy between one’s vision and the vision of 
other actors in the policy process.  They may have a different vision of the ideal, a 
different perception of reality, a different perception of the problem that is preventing 
the realization of the ideal, or, a different perception of how this problem should be 
solved.  As has been mentioned previously, a frequent source of conflict lies in the 
interpretation of uncertainty.  The actors in the policy process must collectively 
determine the quality of the information at hand, and the level of protection justified.  
In the process, the sources of uncertainty identified will be an important subject of 
reflection.   
A reflexive policy community is one that is committed to learning about how decisions 
may affect society and the environment.  Advocates of deliberation argue that reflection 
is provoked through deliberation, as the different actors of the reflexive policy 
community seek to develop a shared understanding of the issue under investigation.  
The insight gained is then applied and implemented through a policy decision, the 
effects of which are monitored.  Inquiry is a transaction with the situation in which 
knowing and doing are inseparable.  In such an approach, the role of the expert is 
deeply transformed (Schön, 1982; Fischer, 2000; Forester; 1999).  Rather than 
providing an optimal technical answer, the role of experts is to participate in the 
collective effort of producing, evaluating and applying knowledge, considering the 
interests at stake, and making a necessarily provisional decision. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Although many still perceive science as the provider of the objective truth, it is now 
increasingly being recognised that science is a social process of knowledge production, 
subject to its own social and cultural biases. As society becomes more aware of the 
complexity of the problems it faces and of the difficulties of studying these problems 
through the scientific approach, it can be expected that the precautionary paradigm will 
gain in influence, slowly displacing the modern paradigm.  Under the precautionary 
paradigm, scientific conclusions are no longer considered definitive, and the legitimacy 
of regulatory decisions can no longer be defended solely by referring to scientific 
assessments. This legitimacy deficit is compensated through an increased 
democratisation of the decision making process. The precautionary paradigm also 
implies a shift towards a regulatory process that is more adaptive and reflexive. 
Adaptive in the sense that regulatory decisions are considered inherently uncertain, 
temporary and experimental, subject to revision as new information emerges.  
Reflexive in the sense that the actors in the policy process are perceived as members of 
a learning community that are capable of collective reflection, and collective responses 
to resolve conflicts between a vision of the ideal and the reality experienced.    
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The precautionary paradigm has profound implications for the role of experts in the 
decision-making process. Experts can no longer place messy factors such as the 
economic, social and political aspects of an issue beyond the boundaries of their 
narrowly defined technical field.  Rather, they must accept these factors as part of their 
legitimate field of concern, opening up to complexity, instability, and uncertainty.  
Experts are now expected to reflect publicly on the quality of their knowledge, 
explicitly revealing their uncertainties and opening up to questioning and confrontation 
by other members of the policy community. They must emancipate themselves from 
the widespread statistical or probabilistic understanding of uncertainty, to recognize the 
full spectrum of the uncertainties characteristic of policy relevant science.   
There is no reason to believe that it will be easy to shift from the modern to the 
precautionary paradigm.  Professional cultures are not easily transformed, especially in 
the situations of high stakes and disputed values that characterize many regulatory 
decision-making processes.  The competences required for scientists and engineers to 
function well in this new context will not be acquired simply as a result of deciding to 
do so.  It is very likely that the shift, where it occurs, will proceed gradually and with 
difficulty as the different actors of the policy community increase their willingness to 
experiment with new modes of interaction and decision making.  Institutional 
arrangements and new methodologies will help facilitate the transition required.  
Methods for assessing uncertainty can help experts fulfill their role under the 
precautionary paradigm.  Through the application of these methods, experts are 
brought to diagnose the uncertainty characterising their assessments, and explicitly 
communicate it to the other actors in the policy community. As will be explained in 
chapter 2 of this dissertation, there is a distinction to be made between the uncertainty 
characterizing information, and the quality of information.  The results of uncertainty 
analysis contribute to a qualified discussion of the quality of the information 
underpinning a policy decision.  The quality of the information available can then be 
considered in determining the extent of the precautionary measures that are warranted 
in a given situation, and how monitoring resources should be allocated.   
This dissertation presents a novel method for diagnosing and communicating 
uncertainty in policy relevant sciences.  The aim is to illustrate the application of a 
method that can help scientists and engineers involved in policy relevant sciences 
fulfill their new role under the precautionary paradigm.  Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
will present the conceptual framework upon which the method is based, essentially 
examining the question: how does uncertainty manifest itself in the context of policy 
relevant science?  Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate how this conceptual framework was 
applied through expert elicitations focusing on two different case studies related to the 
risk assessment of genetically modified crops.  Chapter 5 offers reflections on the 
experiences gained in the process of applying the conceptual framework.     
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2 The anatomy of uncertainty 
in policy relevant sciences 
2.1 Introduction 
Because of the globalization of issues and the interrelationships among systems, the 
consequences of making wrong policy decisions have become more serious and global 
– potentially even catastrophic. Nevertheless, in spite of the profound and partially 
irreducible uncertainties and potentially serious consequences, policy decisions have to 
be made. Scientific decision support aims to provide assistance to policy makers in 
developing and choosing a course of action, given all of the uncertainties surrounding 
the choice. 
Policy makers and the scientists and engineers involved in policy relevant sciences 
have little appreciation for the fact that there are many different dimensions of 
uncertainty, and there is a lack of understanding about their different characteristics, 
relative magnitudes, and available means of dealing with them. Even within the 
different fields of decision support (policy analysis, integrated assessment, 
environmental and human risk assessment, environmental impact assessment, 
engineering risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis, etc.), there is neither a commonly 
shared terminology nor agreement on a generic typology of uncertainties. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain a novel conceptual framework for the systematic 
treatment of uncertainty in decision support, put forth by Walker, Harremoës and co-
workers (Walker et al., 2003) (hereafter referred to as the W&H framework2).
Emphasis will be placed on categories of uncertainty that have traditionally been 
inadequately acknowledged by scientists and engineers, due to the statistical approach 
to uncertainty analysis prevailing in these fields.  Prior to launching into the 
explanation of the W&H framework, it is useful to first examine the context in which it 
is intended to be applied.   
2.2 Uncertainty and quality in policy relevant science 
As uncertainty is a concept subordinate to quality, uncertainty assessment should be 
viewed as part of a greater process of quality control. The distinction between 
uncertainty and quality is often overlooked and it is often assumed that high quality is 
equivalent to low uncertainty.  However, the relationship between quality and 
uncertainty is not so straightforward, and it is worth spending some time here on 
recalling the distinction between the two. 
2 The framework was named by the author in recognition of the roles of Warren Walker as the principal 
author, and Poul Harremoës as an indispensable unifier within the group of authors.  The framework is 
the result of a collective effort by all of the co-authors of the Walker et al. (2003) paper.
18
Quality can be defined as “the totality of characteristics of an object that bear on its 
ability to satisfy an established need”3. Whereas uncertainty is an attribute of 
knowledge, the quality of knowledge is an attribute of the relationship between 
knowledge and the purpose for which it is intended to be used.  Thus, depending on the 
function for which it is intended, uncertain knowledge may still be considered of good 
quality.   
To illustrate the distinction between uncertainty and quality, Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1993) use the example of deforestation in the Himalayas.  The estimates of the per 
capita fuelwood consumption vary by a factor of almost one hundred.  Nonetheless, all 
serious studies agree that their numerical assessments imply that the problem exists and 
that its solution is urgent (Thompson and Warburton, 1985).  In this case, although the 
estimates of per capita fuelwood consumption are subject to considerable uncertainty, 
they are of sufficient quality to determine a need for action.  Similarly, climate change 
predictions provide an example of high certainty, low quality knowledge.  Some 
climate simulations predict a rise in the average temperature of the earth of 0 to 10°C 
over the next forty years.  Common sense indicates that the true value is almost certain 
to lie within this range, but the impacts of temperature changes within this range could 
vary from the trivial to the nearly catastrophic.  The quality of this knowledge is low 
because it is of little assistance in determining whether preventive measures should be 
implemented or not.   
Most regulatory decision making processes begin with the consideration of scientific 
knowledge (i.e., risk assessments).  In this context, defining what is to comprise 
“knowledge”, and what constitutes “quality”, can be quite difficult.  Krayer von Krauss 
et al. (2005) propose that  “knowledge” should be interpreted rather broadly, as 
possibly encompassing (i) scientific knowledge, (ii) knowledge of the uncertainty 
characterizing the latter, (iii) indigenous knowledge, (iv) knowledge on the relevant 
normative biases and assumptions, and v) knowledge on alternative normative 
framings.  von Schomberg (2004) points out that the notion of “quality” of information 
must be considered a “transformable normative standard”, that is to say a standard of 
acceptability which will vary from one policy context to the other, depending on the 
issue at stake, the actors involved, etc. There can be no absolute definition of good or 
bad quality, and it is only possible to arrive at quality judgments through collective 
reflection and deliberation on the information available, in view of the policy context in 
which it is to be used.  Klinke and Renn (2002) propose that in deliberative decision 
making processes, information about the uncertainty characterising scientific 
knowledge should be brought into a deliberative arena, the goal being to collectively 
determine the quality of the knowledge underpinning the regulatory decision (a process 
analogous to the extended peer review explained in chapter 1).  
Scientists and engineers play an important role in supporting a systematic assessment of 
the quality of the information they provide to the decision-making process. In relation 
to the quality of computer models used to support regulatory decisions, Beck (2002) 
points out that quality assurance rests on: (i) whether the model has been constructed of 
approved hypotheses and theory; (ii) matching with history (i.e., classical calibration 
and validation); and (iii) whether the model is suited to its purpose. Krayer von Krauss 
et al. (2005) point out that model quality assessment should: identify a model that — 
3 Adapted from British Standards Institution, BS 4778, London, 1979. 
19
first and foremost — is suited to the purpose, yet bears — secondarily — some 
reasonable (not the unattainably perfect, but more, rather than less) resemblance to the 
‘real’ thing.   
The “fitness for purpose” invoked above is context dependent, and is therefore a matter 
to be determined through deliberation amongst scientists and the other actors of the 
policy community.  However, the extent to which scientific input is comprised of 
approved hypotheses, theories and data, and the extent to which these are representative 
of the phenomena under consideration, are matters that, at least for the time being, are 
by and large determined by scientists.  Typically, this type of quality assessment is 
enacted through uncertainty analyses conducted by the scientists performing the 
assessment, and peer reviews conducted by independent scientists.  The W&H 
framework for uncertainty assessment has been proposed as a methodological 
contribution to the task of experts performing uncertainty analysis or peer review.    
2.3 Uncertainty in decision support: a three dimensional 
concept
In order to understand how uncertainty manifests itself in scientific decision support, it 
is important to first consider the concept of uncertainty itself.  Students in engineering 
and sciences are taught at an early stage how common problems such as sampling 
errors and imprecise measurements generate uncertainty in experimental results.  This 
uncertainty is usually dealt with using statistical methods to express experimental 
results as confidence intervals.   
An example of this type of uncertainty assessment could be the characterization of the 
uncertainty in an experiment aiming to measure the average amount of rainfall per year 
at a particular location.  A number of sources of uncertainty exist in such an 
experiment.  The rain gauge used to measure the amount of rainfall may not be very 
accurate, the researcher reading the rain gauge may make a mistake in doing so, and the 
amount of rain that falls at a given location will be different from one year to the next.  
To express this uncertainty, the results of such an experiment would be reported as a 
mean value, plus or minus a standard deviation, known as a confidence interval.  Thus, 
a researcher may report with 95 % confidence that the average annual rainfall at a given 
location will be 30 mm/yr ± 4 mm/yr.   
The question is: is this approach to assessing uncertainty sufficient to capture the 
uncertainty characteristic of policy relevant sciences?  The answer is unfortunately No.
In policy relevant sciences, different analysts will use different data and different 
methodological approaches, adopt different assumptions, and include different factors 
within the scope of their studies.  Scientific knowledge of the underlying processes may 
evolve with time.  Furthermore, the ethical values of different analysts will invariably 
influence the judgments that often must be made in the course of decision-support 
exercises.  All of these factors represent sources of uncertainty which are difficultly 
communicated using the traditional, statistical approach to uncertainty assessment.    
The W&H framework was born out of a desire to integrate the wide variety of 
terminology being used to describe uncertainty into a single coherent conceptual 
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framework4 .  Walker et al., (2003) adopt a broad definition of uncertainty, as being 
any departure from the unachievable ideal of complete deterministic knowledge of the 
system. At the core of the conceptual framework is the notion that uncertainty is best 
thought of as a three dimensional concept, including the i) Location, ii) Level and iii) 
Nature of uncertainty (as illustrated in Figure 2.1).   
2.4 The location of uncertainty 
To represent a problem, scientists use a combination of data, theory, and models.  
Similarly, all of the widely used approaches to scientific policy assessment rely on 
methodologies that can be considered idealized models, that is, abstractions of the real 
world issues under consideration.  For example, Risk is modeled as a function of a 
system that includes probability and consequence subsystems. The group of cause-
effect relationships encompassed by a scientific problem is referred to as the system 
model for the particular scientific problem. The location dimension refers to where
uncertainty manifests itself within the configuration of the system model.  
                   
The notion of location of uncertainty can be illustrated by the example of a map of the 
world that was drawn by a European cartographer in the 15th century.  Such a map 
would probably contain a fairly accurate description of the geography of Europe.  
Because the trade of spices and other goods between Europe and Asia was well 
established at that time, one might expect that those portions of the map depicting 
China, India, central Asia and the middle-east were also fairly accurate.  However, as 
Columbus only ventured to America in 1492, the portions of the map depicting the 
American continent would likely be quite inaccurate (if they existed at all).  Thus, it 
4 Among recent papers and books directly or indirectly addressing the issue of characterizing uncertainty 
in decision support are: Alcamo and Bartnicki (1987), Beck (1987), Hodges (1987), Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1990), Morgan and Henrion (1990), Rowe(1994), National Research Council (1996) , Shrader-
Frechette (1996), Van der Sluijs (1997), Van Asselt (2000), Walker, Cave, and Rahman (2001), Van 
Asselt and Rotmans, (2002). 
Figure  2.1 – The three dimensions of 
uncertainty. Source: Walker et al. (2003).  
Level
Location
Nature
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would be possible to point to the American continent as a “location” in the model that 
is subject to large uncertainty. 
In a very similar manor, it is possible to pinpoint locations in decision support models 
that are subject to uncertainty.   What are the health effects associated with exposure to 
a new kind of chemical?  Until a wide variety of tests are performed, the answer to that 
question remains subject to much uncertainty.  Thus, there is uncertainty at the “health 
effect” location.
The description of the model locations will vary according to the decision support 
method (model) that is being used.  The locations identified in a cost-benefit analysis 
will be different from the locations identified in an environmental impact assessment.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify certain categories of locations that apply to most 
models.  These are: 
x Context  
x Model structure 
x Inputs 
x Parameters  
x Model outcome (result) 
These categories will be discussed in more detail in the sections to follow. 
2.4.1 Context 
The “Context” location refers to the choice of the boundaries of the system to be 
modeled.  This location is of great importance, as the choice of the boundaries of the 
system determines what part of the real world is considered inside the system (and 
therefore the model), and what part of the real world is left out.  The choice of the 
system boundaries is often referred to as the “problem framing” or “problem 
definition”.  Uncertainty in the problem definition is an important cause for controversy 
in the regulatory debate (Jensen et al., 2003; Meyer et al., 2005).  Different 
stakeholders have different perceptions of what constitutes a risk, which risks should be 
assessed, and how much risk is acceptable.  For example, while some stakeholders may 
demand that all environmental impacts associated with a project be assessed, others 
may find it acceptable to only examine the potential impacts on certain endangered 
species.     
2.4.2 Model structure 
The term “model structure” refers to the variables, parameters and relationships that are 
used to describe (model) a given phenomenon.  Model structure uncertainty is thus 
uncertainty about the form of the model that describes the phenomena included within 
the boundaries of the system.  In situations where the system being studied involves the 
interaction of several complex phenomena, different groups of researchers may have 
different interpretations of what the dominant relationships in the system are, and 
which variables and parameters characterize these relationships.  Uncertainty about the 
structure of the system implies that any one of many model formulations might be a 
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plausible, although partial, representation of the system. Thus, researchers with 
competing interpretations of the system may be equally right, or equally wrong. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the distinction between context uncertainty and model structure 
uncertainty.   
2.4.3 Input 
The “Input” location is associated with the data describing the system.  Uncertainty 
about system data can be generated by a lack of sufficient amounts of data, by the fact 
that the data in hand is of poor quality, or by the fact that data describing the past is 
Figure  2.2 – The Location of Uncertainty. Figs X.1a and X.1b illustrate the concept of context 
uncertainty, where ambiguity in the problem formulation leads to the wrong question being answered 
(also known as a Type III error).  Figs  X.1c and X.1d illustrate the concept of model structure 
uncertainty, where competing interpretations of the cause-effect relationships exist, and it is probable 
that neither of them is entirely correct.  Input is illustrated as that which crosses the boundaries of the 
system (Source: Walker et al., 2003).
Fig. X.1 c. Model Structure: The dominant 
relationships within the system 
Fig. X.1 b. Context Uncertainty: Ambiguity in the 
definition of the boundaries of the system 
Fig. X.1 d. Model Structure Uncertainty: Different 
interpretations of what the dominant relationships 
within the system are (relative to fig. X.1c). 
Fig. X.1 a. Context: Defining the system boundaries
Input 
Input
Input
Input
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extrapolated to describe future conditions.  Measurements can never exactly represent 
the “true” value of that which is being measured.  Uncertainty in data can be due to 
sampling error, inaccuracy, imprecision in the measurements, conflicting data or simply 
lacking measurements.   
The sampling error is an expression of the error associated with the degree of 
representativeness of the sample.  The location, the time and the circumstances at 
which the sample has been taken may not be completely representative of those of the 
“true” value. The inaccuracy is the deviation from the “true” value that has been 
determined using a more accurate procedure, considered to provide the “true value”.  In 
other words, inaccuracy refers to how close a measured value is to the value considered 
“true”. The imprecision is an expression of the variation of the measurements around a 
mean value.  This is in fact a measure of the reproducibility of the result.  The result of 
an experiment may consistently vary around a mean value, but be wrong compared to a 
"true" value. 
2.4.4 Parameters 
Parameters are constants in a model, supposedly invariant within a given simulation. 
The following types of parameters can be found: 
x Exact parameters (e.g. ʌ and e);  
x Fixed parameters, ( e.g. the gravitational constant g);
x A priori chosen parameters;    
x Calibrated parameters.
The uncertainty on exact and fixed parameters can generally be considered as 
negligible within the analysis. However, the extrapolation of parameter values from a 
priori experience does lead to parameter uncertainty, as past circumstances are rarely 
identical to current and future circumstances.  Similarly, because calibrated parameters 
must be determined by calibration using historical data series and sufficient calibration 
data may not be available and/or errors may be present in the data that is available, 
calibrated parameters are also subject to parameter uncertainty. 
2.4.5 Model outcome 
This is the uncertainty caused by the accumulation of uncertainties from all of the 
above locations (context, model, inputs, and parameters).  These uncertainties are 
propagated throughout the model and are reflected in the resulting estimates of the 
outcomes of interest (model result). It is sometimes called prediction error, since it is 
the discrepancy between the true value of an outcome and the model’s predicted value.  
2.5 The level of uncertainty 
The level of uncertainty is essentially an expression of the degree of severity of the 
uncertainty, as seen from the decision-makers perspective.  While in some cases experts 
can express the uncertainty on their results in statistical terms, in other cases it is only 
possible for them to identify that scientific knowledge is limited in a given area, and the 
potential for surprise is therefore large.   
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The notion that uncertainty can manifest itself in different levels is illustrated by the 
example of climate change predictions provided earlier.  The uncertainty involved in 
predicting the change in mean global temperature that can be expected for a given 
increase in the concentration of atmospheric CO2 is small in comparison to the 
uncertainty involved in attempting to predict the myriad of changes that will occur as a 
result of this temperature increase.  Will polar bears become extinct?  Will costal cities 
be submerged?  Are scientists even able to imagine all of the possibilities? 
In accordance with a significant part of the body of literature on uncertainty (Knight, 
1921; Smithson, 1988; Faber et al., 1992; Wynne, 1992; ESTO, 2001), a scale 
containing different categories of levels of uncertainty is proposed, as shown in Figure 
2.3 below.        
The different levels of uncertainty will be discussed in more detail below.  Although they are 
presented as discrete categories, it is often quite difficult to determine the level of uncertainty in 
such discrete terms, and it can therefore be helpful to consider the scale presented in Figure 2.3 
as continuous.   
2.5.1 Determinism and statistical uncertainty 
Determinism is the situation in which everything is known exactly and with absolute 
certainty, an ideal that is never achieved in policy relevant sciences due to the 
complexity of the problems dealt with.  On the scale of levels of uncertainty, it is at the 
end of the scale where there is no uncertainty whatsoever.  Statistical Uncertainty 
describes the situation where there exist solid grounds for the assignment of a discrete 
probability to each of a well-defined set of outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
Potential outcomes can be identified as a finite set of discrete outcomes, or a single 
continuous range of outcomes (e.g. range in Figure 2.4).  In situations of statistical 
uncertainty, analysts possessing knowledge of the form of the distribution (normal, 
lognormal, exponential, etc…) and its properties (V, P, etc…) can predict the 
probability with which any of the potential outcomes will occur.   
As mentioned previously, the uncertainty characterising regulatory assessments is 
frequently reported in statistical terms.  However, where this is the case, it cannot be 
interpreted as an expression of the fact that the assessment is characterised by statistical 
uncertainty only.  Rather, it should be interpreted as a lack of attention to the deeper 
levels of uncertainty.  As will be illustrated further on, many complex real-world policy 
problems involve deep uncertainties that cannot be adequately expressed in statistical 
terms.  It is therefore misleading to express the uncertainty in policy relevant sciences 
only in statistical terms.     
Scenario UncertaintyStatistical Uncertainty Recognised Ignorance Total Ignorance 
Figure  2.3  The levels of uncertainty (adapted from Walker et al, 2003). 
Known outcomes; 
Known probabilities.
Known outcomes;
Unknown probabilities.
Unknown outcomes;
Unknown probabilities.
Nothing is known!
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2.5.2 Scenario uncertainty 
Scenario Uncertainty describes the state where the all of the possible outcomes are 
known, but where it is acknowledged that there exists no credible basis for the 
assignment of probability distributions to these outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 2.5.  
This can be due to the fact that the mechanisms leading to the potential outcomes are 
not well understood and it is, therefore, not possible to formulate the probability of any 
one particular outcome occurring.             
Assumptions are a manifestation of scenario uncertainty.  Decision support exercises 
often involve the use of scenarios in which a number of assumptions are made in order 
to simplify the problem being studied. In many cases, analysts do not have the time 
and/or data required to verify the validity of these assumptions. In some cases, 
verification may be practically or theoretically impossible.  In many cases outcomes 
identified as being “improbable” by analysts are frequently left out of assessments in 
order to devote more resources to the analysis of outcomes deemed more likely (or 
about which more is known) (Patt, 1999).   
An example that is useful in order to illustrate the notion of scenario uncertainty is that 
of the concerns raised over the use of antimicrobials or antibiotics in animal feedstuff 
(Edqvist and Pedersen, 2001).   Antibiotics are probably the single most important 
discovery in the history of medicine.  They have saved millions of lives by killing 
bacteria that cause diseases in humans and animals.  Beginning in the 1940s, low levels 
of antibiotics began to be added to animal feedstuff as it was observed that this practice 
could increase the growth rate of the animals, increase the efficiency of food 
Statistical Uncertainty
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Figure  2.4  Statistical uncertainty: known outcomes, known probabilities. 
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conversion by the animals, as well as have other benefits such as improved egg 
production in laying hens, increased litter size in sows and increased milk yield in dairy 
cows.  Over the years, concerns developed over the potential for bacteria to develop 
resistance to the antibiotics.  It was feared that the widespread use of the antibiotics 
would lead to the development of resistant bacterial strains, and that these antibiotics 
would therefore no longer be effective in the treatment of disease in humans.  The 
scientific evidence available indicated that the development of bacterial resistance 
could take place, but how quickly and to what extent this could occur remain unknown 
to this day.  The question of whether the short-term benefits outweigh the potential 
long-term risks is still being debated.  In this case, the scenario is clear but the 
probability of its occurrence is unknown.  The uncertainty here is of a level greater than 
statistical uncertainty, and is referred to as scenario uncertainty.           
2.5.3 Ignorance 
Identified Ignorance describes the state where there exist neither grounds for the 
assignment of probabilities, nor even the basis for defining the complete set of potential 
outcomes.  It is a state where fundamental uncertainty about the mechanisms and 
functional relationships being studied has been identified, and where the scientific basis 
for developing scenarios is weak. In some cases ignorance may be lessened by 
conducting further research, which implies that it might be possible to somehow 
achieve a better understanding.  However, in cases where the functional relationships 
are very complicated and/or the number of parameters is very large, or in some cases 
where the relationships are inherently unidentifiable, due to e.g. chaotic properties in 
the system that make predictions impossible, neither research nor development can 
resolve the ignorance.  This is referred to as indeterminacy. Total ignorance is the 
other extreme from determinism on the scale of uncertainty, which implies a deep level 
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Figure  2.5  Scenario uncertainty: known outcomes, unknown probabilities.
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of uncertainty, to the extent that it is not even know that knowledge is lacking. In 
Figure 2.3, the continuing arrow at the end of the scale is used to indicate that there is 
no way of knowing the full extent of our ignorance. 
An example of a policy problem in which, for a while, ignorance was the dominant 
level of uncertainty is that of the outbreak of Mad cow disease (also known as BSE) in 
Britain (van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2001).  In an effort to reduce costs and 
maximise the re-use of resources, it was common practice that the remains of sheep, 
cattle and other animals were recycled and used as a source of protein in animal 
feedstuffs.  Following the diagnosis of the first cases of BSE in 1986, it was noticed 
that the pathological characteristics of the new disease closely resembled scrapie, a 
contagious disease common in the UK sheep population.  Scrapie is a disease that 
attacks the brain of sheep, is untreatable and invariably fatal.  Health authorities soon 
observed that contaminated feed was the principle cause of BSE in cattle.  However, 
the question remained: contaminated by what?  There was no scientific evidence that 
eating sheep meat from scrapie-infected animals could pose a health risk, and health 
authorities could not be sure that the agent that caused BSE had in fact derived from 
scrapie.  Moreover, there was no scientific evidence indicating that BSE could 
subsequently be transmitted to humans in the form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), 
and it was a big surprise when, in 1995, it was discovered that this could happen.  
The notion of ignorance is illustrated by considering the uncertainty characterizing an 
assessment of the potential costs associated to BSE, performed at the time of the 
discovery of BSE in 1986.  No historical data on BSE was available and scientific 
understanding of how the disease is contracted was limited. The extent of the public 
outcry that would eventually occur remained unknown, as did the extent of the loss of 
exports and the drop in domestic demand that ensued.  Data on the relationship between 
BSE and CJD would not become available for another 10 years.  In this context, any 
assessment would necessarily rely on a large number of assumptions and there would 
be no credible basis for the assignment of probabilities.  Furthermore, at the time there 
was not even a credible basis to claim that all of the potential ramifications or costs 
(outcomes) of the BSE crisis had been thought of.  The uncertainty characterizing this 
situation is a good example of ignorance.
2.6 The nature of uncertainty 
Some phenomena, such as rainfall and other climatic processes, are inherently variable.  
Due to this variability, an exact description of the system will always remain 
unachievable, regardless of how much effort is invested into improving knowledge.  In 
the case of other phenomena, the ability of scientists to study the phenomena is limited.  
The categories “epistemic uncertainty” and “stochastic uncertainty” are used to 
distinguish between the different natures of uncertainty, as follows:   
x Epistemic uncertainty: uncertainty that is due to the imperfection of the 
knowledge of the system.  This imperfection can be due to the inherent limits to 
knowing (e.g. indeterminate systems), or limitations in the methods available to 
study the system (e.g. inability to observe a phenomena due to lack of adequate 
observation instruments).  In some cases, epistemic uncertainty can be reduced 
by more research or by improving study methods.  
x Stochastic uncertainty: The uncertainty due to the inherent variability of some 
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of the phenomena included in the system.  This variability is often encountered 
when considering human and natural systems.  This variability can be 
described, but it is irreducible.   
To illustrate the distinction between epistemic and stochastic uncertainty, it is worth re-
considering the example of the experiment aiming to measure the average amount of 
rainfall per year at a particular location.  In the initial example, three different sources 
of uncertainty were identified:  
1. The rain gauge used to measure the amount 
of rainfall may not be very accurate;  
2. The researcher reading the rain gauge may 
make a mistake in doing so; 
3. The amount of rain that falls at a given 
location will always be different from one 
year to the next.   
The first two sources of uncertainty identified above are due to imperfections in the 
methods used to study the phenomena. One could imagine that by using more 
sophisticated rain gauges, by increasing the number of samples taken and by being 
more careful in taking measurements, the uncertainty due to these two sources could be 
reduced.  Because this uncertainty is due to limitations in knowledge, or limitations in 
the means we use to acquire knowledge, it is referred to as epistemic uncertainty (the 
word “epistemology” is derived from the Greek episteme "knowledge" and logos
"reason").
The third source of uncertainty identified is different from the first two.  No matter how 
many samples are taken, and no matter how sophisticated and precise the equipment 
used to do so is, uncertainty will always remain.  This is due to the simple fact that the 
amount of rain that falls at a given location is a function of an overwhelming number of 
chaotic natural processes.  These processes are inherently variable, and the amount of 
rain falling in a given location will therefore never be exactly the same from one year to 
the next.  This uncertainty is referred to as stochastic uncertainty.
Determining the nature of the uncertainty present can be especially useful in deciding 
where to devote resources to reduce uncertainty.  Where epistemic uncertainty is 
dominant, additional research, whether empirical study or theoretical research aimed at 
improving understanding, can potentially reduce uncertainty and thereby improve the 
quality of the output.  However, where stochastic uncertainty is dominant, additional 
research is not likely to reduce uncertainty, and an adaptive implementation process 
may be the most effective way of moving forth.  
2.7 Implications for the communication of uncertainty 
The implication of the level dimension of uncertainty is that, from the point of view of 
the decision maker, the severity of the uncertainty identified increases as one 
progresses from statistical uncertainty through to identified ignorance. Only 
communicating statistical uncertainty, or communicating scenario uncertainty and 
ignorance in statistical terms, risks conveying a pretence of high certainty, when this is 
not actually the case.  Thus, scenario uncertainty and identified ignorance should be 
communicated in qualitative terms, stressing the fact that the level of uncertainty is too 
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high to provide a meaningful statistical description of uncertainty.  Examples of 
qualitative descriptors of uncertainty will be provided in the chapters to come. 
When communicating uncertainty amongst analysts familiar with the W&H framework, 
it could be useful to express the results of the uncertainty analysis in the form of an 
uncertainty matrix.  The purpose of an uncertainty matrix is to provide a systematic and 
graphical overview of the location, level, and nature of the uncertainty associated with 
a policy assessment, as shown in Figure 2.6. The vertical axis identifies the locations of 
uncertainty – i.e., the different model locations characterizing a particular policy 
assessment.  The first three columns of the horizontal axis cover the level of 
uncertainty in relation to all locations and the next two columns indicate the nature of 
uncertainty for each location.  
Figure  2.6 – Uncertainty matrix (Source: Walker et al., 2003). 
A further level of complexity can be introduced by considering the relative importance 
of a particular component (location) of the model to the output from the model.  While 
for some component, a small error may result in a large change in the output from the 
model, in other cases, a large error may have only a small effect.  This is generally 
referred to as the sensitivity of a model to a particular component.  Either a quantitative 
(Saltelli et al., 2000) or a qualitative sensitivity analysis (van der Sluijs, 1997; van 
Asselt, 2000) can be used to identify which uncertainties have the greatest impact on 
the outcomes of interest. The insights derived from such a sensitivity analysis are useful 
in determining where additional information or effort is most required and to allocate 
project resources accordingly. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
The more complex, the more multi-disciplinary and the more uncertain a phenomenon 
appears to be, the more necessary deliberation about uncertainty is.  Uncertainty 
assessment should be viewed as part of a greater process of quality control of policy 
relevant information. The W&H framework is an attempt to harmonize the terminology 
for characterizing uncertainty in policy relevant science.  It suggests that uncertainty is 
a three dimensional concept defined by the location, the level and the nature of 
uncertainty. The W&H framework can be combined with other tools – for example, 
sensitivity analysis – to identify the most important locations of uncertainty.  The 
framework can be applied in the initial assessment process or in the peer review 
process.  Doing so can help clarify dissenting views and reveal that a case is 
characterised by more uncertainty than assessors had initially anticipated.  Furthermore, 
it can yield guidance on whether or not it is appropriate to communicate uncertainty in 
statistical terms, in view of avoiding the creation of a pretence of certainty, when this is 
not the case.   
Since its introduction, the W&H framework has been applied in the two empirical 
studies presented in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, related to the uncertainty 
characterizing the risk assessment of genetically modified crops (Krayer von Krauss et 
al., 2004;  Krayer von Krauss et al., in preparation).  In addition, the W&H framework 
has been incorporated to the uncertainty management guidance system used at the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (RIVM/MNP) (van der Sluijs et al.,
2003; Janssen et al., 2005).   
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3 Uncertainty in the risk assessment of 
herbicide tolerant oilseed crops 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the experiences gained in applying the W&H framework 
through expert elicitations aimed at obtaining qualitative and quantitative information 
regarding the uncertainty present in the environmental risk assessment of impacts on 
agriculture of genetically modified herbicide tolerant oilseed crops (canola). The 
interviews were conducted with leading canola experts during the spring of 2003.  The 
results of these interviews were first reported in Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004). 
3.2 Background on the case study 
Genetic modification refers to the direct transfer or modification of genetic material 
using recombinant DNA techniques. One of the most widespread applications of 
genetic modification in agriculture has been to develop crops possessing the enzymatic 
capacity to break down a particular herbicide, effectively making the plants resistant to 
the herbicide.  This modification can potentially simplify weed control by making it 
possible to apply herbicide onto fields in the early stages of crop growth, thereby 
eliminating weeds without damaging crop plants.  Reducing competition by weeds 
improves crop yields.   
There are currently three types of genetically modified herbicide resistant canola crops 
commercially available in North America: glyphosate tolerant (Round-Up Ready¥)
canola, glufosinate tolerant (Liberty Link¥) canola, and bromoxynil tolerant 
(Navigator¥) canola.  As a case study, this investigation used the risk assessment of the 
glufosinate resistant Liberty Rape¥ canola (line MS8/RF3), developed by AgrEvo and 
approved for market release in Canada and the EU in 1996, and in the US in 1998 
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 1996; Belgian Service of Biosafety & 
Biotechnology, 1997; USDA, 1999). 
The uncertainty analysis focused exclusively on potential adverse impacts on 
agricultural and cultivation practices.  The concern addressed by regulatory authorities 
in this regard is that herbicide tolerant volunteer plants (canola plants emerging as 
weeds in subsequent crops as a result of seed loss during harvest), and herbicide 
tolerant hybrids (plants resulting from cross-pollination between canola and its wild 
relatives), could lead to increased weediness, thereby creating a negative impact on 
agriculture and cultivation practices.   
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the USDA conducted the 
agricultural risk assessment for the United States. The conclusion of the APHIS risk 
assessment was that Liberty Link canola “will not have a negative impact on 
agricultural and cultivation practices”. The basis for this conclusion was first and 
foremost that mechanical means or alternative herbicides with different modes of action 
could be used to manage tolerant volunteers and hybrids, should they occur. 
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Furthermore, the seed bank parameters, fitness parameters and the sensitivity of 
volunteer plants to other herbicides would be similar to those of existing commercial 
varieties of rapeseed.  APHIS hypothesized that the reduced seed dormancy of hybrids, 
the reduced fertility of these hybrids, and the absence of selection pressure for the 
herbicide tolerance trait outside of cultivation, would make it very unlikely that 
populations of the Liberty Link-hybrids would persist in the wild.  
3.3 Selection of experts 
The main criterion used to select the experts was their familiarity with the case study.  
The majority of the experts interviewed were Canadian.  The first edible varieties of 
rapeseed were isolated in Canada in the 1960s and 70s.  By now, canola has become 
Canada’s third largest crop (after wheat and barley), and Canadian experts are among 
the world’s foremost authorities on issues relating to canola.  Canada was the first 
country to deregulate Liberty Link canola.  All of the experts interviewed were either 
involved in research activities pertaining to canola, or in activities pertaining to the risk 
assessment of genetically modified canola.  Some effort was made to examine an 
envelope of salient perspectives by drawing on expertise in both government and 
industry.  Table I presents the affiliations and titles of the experts interviewed. The 
specific area of expertise of researchers is indicated in parentheses.  
Table I Experts interviewed in this study (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004)). 
Expert Affiliation Title (Expertise) 
1 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Scientist (Crop breeding) 
2 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Scientist (Weed resistance) 
3 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Scientist  (Cytogenetics & biotechnology, crop breeding & diversification) 
4 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Principal Research Scientist (Plant systematics, crop & weed population biology) 
5 Risø National Laboratory,  Denmark 
Senior Researcher (Hybrid cross compatibility & fertility, genetics) 
6 Bayer Crop Science  (formerly with AgrEvo Canada) 
Director, Public and Government Affairs 
7 Expert 7 preferred to withhold affiliation information 
3.4 Methodology 
As mentioned in section 2.2 of chapter 2, the W&H framework is intended to be 
applied within an institutional context, in the course of the assessment process or the 
peer review process.  It is envisioned that the uncertainty analysis would be performed 
by experts performing the regulatory assessment or a peer review thereof.   
In the current PhD study, it was not possible to gain access to experts performing an 
actual  risk assessment or peer review.  This context was therefore simulated by having 
experts review a risk assessment study that had been conducted previously.  The review 
took the form of an interview in which experts were asked a number of questions that 
implicitly reflected the concepts put forth in the W&H framework.  The goal was to 
communicate the W&H framework and elicit the experts’ knowledge of uncertainty, 
without intimidating or confusing the experts with an overwhelming number of new 
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concepts.  The interviews were conducted in five basic parts as follows: 
i. Review of a proposed influence diagram; 
ii. Assumptions analysis; 
iii. Evaluation of empirical information; 
iv. Surprise and ignorance analysis; 
v. Assessment of level of uncertainty and 
sensitivity analysis. 
3.4.1 Model locations and structure  
The first part of the interview focused on the locations dimension of uncertainty.  The 
goal was to inventory the important model locations for the risk assessment, as well as 
to identify disagreement as to which parameters and relationships (model locations) 
were important. Disagreement would be interpreted as a manifestation of competing 
model structures, which would indicate uncertainty on the model structure.  To achieve 
this goal, the experts were presented with an influence diagram (5) (see Figure 3.1) 
illustrating the cause-effect relationship between the cultivation of the GM crop and the 
potential risk to agricultural and cultivation practices. The influence diagram was 
inferred on the basis of the risk assessment report published by APHIS (USDA, 1999).   
(5) The influence diagram is based on un-published work performed in collaboration with K.H. Madsen, 
Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Denmark.  
Figure 3.1.  Influence diagram showing causal relationships and key parameters 
considered in the APHIS risk assessment. (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004)).
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As such, it can be considered a representation of the mental model of the APHIS risk 
assessors.  A detailed explanation of the influence diagram is provided by Krayer von 
Krauss et al., (2004). 
The diagram was explained to the experts, and they were asked to comment on whether 
the diagram mentioned all of the parameters and processes that they thought were key 
for evaluating the risk, and on whether they thought the diagram contained any 
superfluous elements.  
3.4.2 Exploring uncertainty 
The second, third and fourth parts of the interview were aimed at generating a dialogue 
on the various sources of uncertainty that could characterise the model locations 
identified in the first part of the interview.  The goal was to raise the awareness of the 
experts to the various sources of uncertainty that can characterise a risk assessment, 
prior to proceeding to the assessment of the level of uncertainty in the fifth part of the 
interview. 
As was explained in chapter 2 of this dissertation, assumptions are a frequent 
manifestation of scenario uncertainty.  Thus, in the second part of the interview, the 
experts were presented with the conclusion of the APHIS risk assessment and the 
justification provided by APHIS for its conclusion. The experts were then asked to 
identify any assumptions implied by the conclusion reached.  As in Risbey et al.
(2001), the experts were asked to critic the validity of each assumption identified, and 
identify the potential consequences of the assumption being wrong.   
In the third part, experts were asked to assess the quality of the empirical information 
upon which the conclusion of the risk assessment was based.  In the APHIS risk 
assessment, four key considerations (model locations) were supported by reference to 
empirical investigations, these were:  the sexual compatibility of the GM crop with wild 
relatives; the seed bank parameters of glufosinate tolerant volunteers and hybrids (seed 
germination, seed dormancy and seed production); the fitness of glufosinate tolerant 
volunteers and hybrids (pest and disease resistance characteristics, time to flowering 
and fertility); and the sensitivity of glufosinate tolerant volunteers and hybrids to 
alternative herbicides and mechanical means of weed control.  The evaluation of data 
quality was based on the four different criteria contained in a pedigree matrix, a tool 
initially proposed by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990). The pedigree matrix used in this 
study, illustrated in Table II, was developed by van der Sluijs et al. (2004) (see also van 
der Sluijs et al., 2005).   
The “proxy” scale evaluates how closely the quantity measured in practice resembles 
the actual variable about which information is desired for the purpose of the risk 
assessment.  The “empirical” scale evaluates the degree to which direct empirical 
observations are used to produce data, as opposed to producing data by other means 
such as modelling.  The “method” scale evaluates the quality of the methods used to 
gather the data, compared to the norm in the field.  Finally, the “validation” scale refers 
to the degree to which efforts have been made to crosscheck the data against 
independent sources.  Experts were asked to apply these scales to evaluate data quality 
in each of the areas for which APHIS cited information as the basis for its conclusion.  
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The evaluation was based on the expert’s impression of the general “state of the art” at 
the time of approval (96-98), rather than on the specific studies cited by APHIS.  
Table II.  Pedigree criteria for evaluating data quality (from van der Sluijs et al., 2004) 
Score Proxy Empirical Method Validation 
4 A direct measure of the desired quantity. 
Controlled experiments 
and large sample; direct 
measurements. 
Best available practice in well 
established discipline. 
Compared with 
independent measurements 
of the same variable over 
long domain. 
3 Good fit or measure. 
Historical/field data, 
uncontrolled observations, 
small sample direct 
measurements. 
Reliable method common 
within established discipline 
or best available practice in 
immature discipline. 
Compared with 
independent measurements 
of closely related variable 
over shorter period. 
2
Well correlated but 
not measuring the 
same thing. 
Modelled/derived data, 
Indirect measurements. 
Acceptable method but 
limited consensus on 
reliability. 
Measurements not 
independent, proxy 
variable, limited domain. 
1 Weak correlation. 
Educated guesses, indirect 
approximation, rule of 
thumb estimates. 
Preliminary methods with 
unknown reliability. 
Weak and very indirect 
validation. 
0 Not correlated and not clearly related. Crude speculation. No discernible rigor. No validation performed. 
In the fourth part of the interview, the surprise and ignorance analysis, the experts were 
asked a number of questions aimed at identifying potential indirect impacts that may 
not have been considered in the risk assessment, and identifying areas of the risk 
assessment where scientific knowledge is still very limited.  Throughout most of the 
interview, the experts were asked to answer the questions from the perspective of a risk 
assessor performing an assessment at the time Liberty Link canola was originally 
approved (1996-98).  The surprise and ignorance analysis was the only part of the 
interview where experts answered the questions from a current-day perspective.   
3.4.3 Level and nature of uncertainty 
The fifth part of the interview directly addressed the level and nature dimensions of the 
W&H framework.  The experts were asked to quantify the level of uncertainty on key 
elements in the influence diagram, as well as the sensitivity of the conclusion of the risk 
assessment to changes in each of the key elements.  The experts were also asked to 
identify the nature of the uncertainty. As explained in chapter 2 of this dissertation, that 
is if the uncertainty was mainly due to natural variability in the phenomena being 
observed (stochastic uncertainty), or if it was rather due to limitations in scientific 
knowledge (epistemic uncertainty).   
In order to assess the level of uncertainty, a 0 to 1 scale was used.  The scale, illustrated 
in Figure 3.2, was divided into the three broad categories put forth in chapter 2: 
statistical uncertainty; scenario uncertainty and identified ignorance.  In the Figure, the 
main features of each category are indicated in the boxes under the scale.  The 
categories were explained to the experts, and they were asked to assess the level of 
uncertainty that characterized each of the key parameters and processes in the influence 
diagram identified in part one of the interview.     
In order to assess the sensitivity of the conclusion of the risk assessment to changes in 
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the element being assessed, a second 0 to 1 scale was used, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.  
On the scale, a 0 implies that a large change in the element would have only a small 
effect on the conclusion, a 0.5 implies that a change would have a proportional effect, 
and a 1 implies that a small change would have a large effect.  The scale was explained 
to the experts and they were asked to assess the sensitivity of the conclusion to changes 
in each of the key parameters and processes identified in the influence diagram.  No 
guidance was given as to the interpretation of the terms “large” and “small”, and the 
experts were therefore to make their own subjective judgment in this respect.  
3.4.4 Consistency test 
Finally, when time permitted (in 5 out of the 7 interviews conducted), a test was 
performed in order to verify how internally consistent the experts were in assessing the 
uncertainty level and the sensitivity associated with various elements of the influence 
diagram.  Experts were given 100 poker chips and asked to allocate a fixed number of 
chips to each of the key elements of the influence diagram that they had assessed 
previously, to indicate how much they would be willing to invest to completely 
eliminate the uncertainty on that element of the influence diagram (which for internally 
consistent experts, should be roughly proportional to the influence of the uncertain 
diagram element on the conclusion of the risk assessment).   
3.5 Results and discussion 
3.5.1 Model locations and structure 
The majority of the experts felt that the influence diagram shown in Figure 3.1 captured 
all of the processes and parameters they considered important to assessing the risk.   
One expert pointed out that the diagram should also illustrate the fact that the seed lots 
for glufosinate tolerant canola can be contaminated by pollen carrying genes conferring 
perfect 
deterministic 
knowledge
total 
ignorance 
Known outcomes, 
Known probability 
Unknown outcomes, 
Unknown probability
Known outcomes, 
Unknown probability
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
Figure. 3.2  The quantitative scale used to assess the level of uncertainty (Source: 
Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004)). 
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
Large 
variation has 
small effect 
Small 
variation has 
large effect 
Figure. 3.3  The scale describing sensitivity of risk analysis conclusions to elements 
of the risk model (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al., (2004)).
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tolerance to a herbicide other than glufosinate (e.g. glyphosate, also known as Round-
Up¥). In subsequent interviews, other experts questioned on the issue of seed lot 
contamination agreed that this was occurring with increasing frequency in practice.  
The practical implication of this particular instance of seed lot contamination is that 
affected farmers will find canola plants in their fields that are tolerant to more than one 
herbicide.  The seeds from these plants could eventually lead to volunteer plants that 
are tolerant to more than one herbicide.  Multiple herbicide tolerance makes it more 
difficult for farmers to control volunteer plants as it reduces the number of weed 
management options available to them.   
Another expert pointed out that the glufosinate tolerance gene might increase the profit 
that individual farmers can earn from cultivating canola, which in turn may result in an 
increase in the total area of canola being grown.  According to the expert, the effect of 
this increase should also be assessed, as it could lead to indirect impacts.  An example 
provided by the expert was that canola requires a greater input of agro-chemicals than 
do cereals.  None of the experts identified any superfluous items in the diagram. 
3.5.2 Assumptions Analysis 
Table III presents the two main assumptions identified by the experts.  The second 
column contains a summary of the expert’s opinion of the validity of each assumption, 
while the third column briefly describes the consequences that could occur if the 
assumptions turned out to be false.      
Table III.  Key assumptions identified by experts (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al., 2004). 
Assumption Validity Potential Consequences 
Alternative herbicides and 
mechanical means of controlling 
herbicide tolerant volunteers and 
hybrids are available and will be 
used by farmers. 
This is thought to be a good assumption.  
Alternative herbicides are available, 
especially if the follow-up crop is a 
cereal crop.  Fewer alternatives are 
available if legumes or other broad leaf 
crops are grown in the following crop 
rotation.  The presence of multiple 
tolerant volunteers also reduces the 
options available.   In the case of 
mechanical means, these are available, 
but not favoured by farmers as they cost 
more.
Increased costs for farmers due to the 
additional costs imposed by 
volunteer control or the yield loss 
incurred due to competition by 
volunteers.
Fertility and dormancy of hybrids 
will be reduced, and therefore 
hybrids will not persist.   
The validity of this assumption is 
difficult to determine.  Although this 
was stated as a fact and supported with 
empirical data in the APHIS risk 
assessment, several experts pointed out 
that this is an area where the evidence is 
very weak and that it was an assumption 
that hybrids would not persist.  One 
expert pointed out that some data now 
indicate that the fertility of hybrids is 
reduced to 50-60% in the first 
generation, but is restored to 90% in 
following generations. 
Feral populations of hybrids could 
persist outside of cultivation, thereby 
leading to the existence of 
glufosinate tolerance gene pool in 
wild populations.  Through cross-
pollination, glufosinate tolerance 
genes could be spread both in 
agricultural and uncultivated settings.  
3.5.3 Evaluation of empirical information 
Table IV presents the results of the evaluation of empirical information on which the 
APHIS risk assessment was based, according to the pedigree criteria presented in Table 
II. Only point estimates were elicited.  The first column contains the crucial 
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information and the next four columns show the experts’ assessment of how well these 
issues have been explored.  Bold numbers are the average of all the responses.  They 
are flanked by the lowest and the highest responses that were given.  The last column 
shows the overall strength, a rather nebulous cross-row ranking tool, calculated as the 
sum of the scores shown in the first four columns, divided by the maximum total score 
achievable (i.e., divided by 16).   
Table IV.  Results of the evaluation of empirical information. Bold numbers are 
average response over all experts.  They are flanked by the lowest and the highest 
single responses. “Proxy” refers to how closely the quantity measured in practice 
resembles the actual variable about which information is desired.  “Empirical” means 
the degree to which direct empirical observations are used to produce data, as opposed 
to producing data by other means such as modeling.  “Method” describes the strength 
of the methods used to gather the data, the gold standard being field observation.   
“Validation” is the degree to which efforts have been made to crosscheck the data 
against independent sources. Refer to Table II, above, for scoring guidelines (Source: 
Krayer von Krauss et al., 2004)). 
Evaluation Scores Empirical 
Information Proxy 
(0-4)
Empirical 
(0-4)
Method 
(0-4)
Validation 
(0-4) 
Overall Strength 
(0-1)
1. Compatibility 
of GM crop with 
wild relatives
0 – 2.9 -
4 3 - 3.1 - 4 3 - 3.1 - 4 1 - 2.9 - 4 0.44 - 0.75 - 1
2. Seed bank 
parameters of 
glufosinate 
tolerant 
volunteers.
2 - 3.1 - 4 1 - 2.9 - 4 1 - 2.7 - 4 1 - 2.0 - 3 0.38 - 0.67 - 0.94
3. Seed bank 
parameters of 
glufosinate 
tolerant hybrids.
2 - 3.1 - 4 0 - 2.7 - 4 1 - 2.7 - 4 1 - 2.0 - 3 0.32 - 0.66 - 0.94
4.  Fitness 
parameters of 
glufosinate 
tolerant 
volunteers.
1 – 2.8 -
4 1 – 3.0 - 4 1 - 2.4 - 4 1 - 2.0 - 4 0.32 - 0.64 - 1
5.  Fitness 
parameters of 
glufosinate 
tolerant hybrids. 
1 – 2.8 -
4 0 - 2.0 - 4 1 - 2.3 - 4 1 - 2.0 - 4 0.25 - 0.57 - 1
6. Sensitivity of 
glufosinate 
tolerant volunteers 
to alternative 
means of weed 
management. 
3 - 3.8 - 4 2 - 3.4 - 4 3 - 3.9 - 4 1 - 3.2 - 4 0.56 - 0.89 - 1
7. Sensitivity of 
glufosinate 
tolerant hybrids to 
alternative means 
of weed 
management. 
3 - 3.8 - 4 1 - 3.3 - 4 3 - 3.7 - 4 1 - 3.0 - 4 0.50 - 0.86 - 1
The results of the evaluation of the empirical information are in accordance with the 
observation made by some experts in the Assumptions Analysis, which was that the 
empirical information on the seed bank parameters and fitness parameters of hybrids 
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was weak at the time of approval.  A general trend seems to be that more and stronger 
information was available on volunteer plants than on hybrids at the time of approval.  
One expert explained that this was to be expected as only small numbers of hybrids 
occur in practice(6), making it difficult to obtain test specimens with which to perform 
research.   
One expert mentioned that, in some cases, uncertainty arises due to lack of agreement 
amongst experts about the definition of certain key concepts, such as the fitness of a 
plant and how it should be measured.   
An issue pointed out by several of the experts was that while risk assessors are 
interested in how the volunteers and hybrids will thrive in the agro-ecosystem, much of 
the data available at the time of the approval of Liberty Link canola resulted from 
small-scale, short-term greenhouse or field investigations.  Because the conditions 
under which the tests are conducted may not be representative of the full array of 
relevant conditions, it can be difficult to generalize the test results. Similarly, most tests 
that had been performed, at the time, took place over the course of one plant lifecycle, 
and data from long-term, intergenerational tests were not available.   
Finally, many experts pointed out that because of the experience gained in the time 
elapsed since the first herbicide tolerant canola crops were approved, they thought that 
stronger data is available today then was available at the time of approval. 
3.5.4 Surprise and ignorance analysis 
An important potential indirect impact that was identified by some of the experts 
interviewed is related to the potential impact of herbicide tolerant volunteers on 
agricultural and cultivation practices.  As was pointed in the Assumptions Assessment, 
alternative herbicides are available to combat glufosinate tolerant volunteer plants.  
Farmers are not likely to incur significant additional costs as a result of glufosinate 
tolerant volunteers for the following reasons: 
x It is common practice that fields are sprayed with the herbicide GLYPHOSATE
prior to spring seeding, in order to eliminate all living plants from the field 
prior to the sewing of the new crop.  (In the following discussion we will 
emphasize GLYPHOSATE with capital letters so the reader won’t confuse it 
with glufosinate.) 
x Most volunteer glufosinate tolerant plants present in the field will be 
eliminated by the GLYPHOSATE at this time.  However, some seeds will likely 
remain dormant and germinate at a later time.   
x Because in North America glufosinate is only registered for use on canola, 
and because canola is only grown every third year in the crop rotation, 
glufosinate tolerant plants emerging at any point during the intervening years 
would be sensitive to whatever herbicide is in use at the time, and would 
likely be eliminated.  Thus, by the time a new crop of glufosinate tolerant 
canola is planted (3 years later), the bulk of the seed bank will have been 
(6)  The elicitation took place prior to the publication of recent research where it is estimated that 
hybridization with some weedy relatives could yield up to 49,000 hybrid plants per year in the U.K.  
(Wilkinson et al., Science v.302 p.457-9. Oct 2003).  
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depleted and glufosinate tolerant volunteers should not present a major 
problem.      
However, a different scenario emerges when GLYPHOSATE tolerant volunteers are 
considered rather than glufosinate tolerant volunteers.  Unlike glufosinate, GLYPHOSATE
has a broad spectrum of permitted herbicidal uses.  Because GLYPHOSATE tolerant 
canola volunteers will not be eliminated if only GLYPHOSATE is used in the spring pre-
treatment, another herbicide (e.g. 2, 4-D, MCPA) would have to be mixed in with 
GLYPHOSATE in order to clear the field.  This would entail additional costs for the 
farmer, it could have implications for the more environmentally benign form of 
agriculture known as no-till agriculture, as well as implications for the case-by-case 
basis upon which regulatory risk assessments of GMCs are currently conducted.  An in-
depth explanation of these implications is provided by Krayer von Krauss et al., (2004).   
Another issue pointed out by some of the experts interviewed was that while the APHIS 
risk assessment is concerned solely with the potential impacts due to increased 
weediness, no attention was given to indirect economic impacts that may be incurred as 
a result of the cultivation of herbicide tolerant canola.  Due to the trade restrictions 
imposed by certain countries on genetically modified crops, the very fact that the 
canola is genetically modified may result in reduced revenues from exports.  
Furthermore, Canada is the world’s largest exporter of mustard seed.  Because canola 
and mustard are able to pollinate one-another, albeit at very low frequencies, there is a 
possibility that herbicide tolerance traits could contaminate mustard seeds destined for 
export, possibly leading to a reduced demand for Canadian mustard.  In a similar vein, 
beekeepers may also see their products labelled genetically modified.  It was also 
pointed out that specific farmer groups might suffer more damages than others.  For 
example, some organic farmers may lose their certification and the associated economic 
premium in the event their crops are contaminated by pollen containing the herbicide 
tolerance trait.   
On the issue of scientific ignorance, some experts raised the weak knowledge of the 
fate of the modified genetic material in the soil.  The horizontal transfer of GM DNA to 
soil microflora is an area where scientific knowledge is particularly weak.  Amongst 
other things, it is not known if the modified DNA could be transferred horizontally to 
the microbial community, or what ramifications this could have.  
It is interesting that no expert mentioned unidentified ignorance: the yet unknown or 
unsuspected negative impact(s), the set of causal linkages that science has not yet put 
together, the surprise scenario that motivates precautionary thinking. This may be due 
to the well-documented phenomenon of expert overconfidence (Morgan and Henrion, 
1990), or perhaps to prudent aversion to venturing outside of the expert’s domain of 
expertise.  However, it may also point to an important difference between risk analysts 
and their audience. The risk analyst must summarize the best available knowledge and 
make a recommendation on this basis, while the audience does not necessarily agree 
that available knowledge is sufficient. 
3.5.5 Level and nature of uncertainty
Figure 3.4 summarizes three qualities of the uncertainty surrounding 7 key model 
locations for the risk assessment for glufosinate resistant canola: the “level” of 
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Figure 3.4 Results of Quantitative Assessment of 
Level, Sensitivity and Influence of Uncertainty (I = 
(L x S)½).  Only point estimates were elicited.  Solid 
symbols denote the average of the 7 individual point 
estimates obtained. They are bounded on the left by 
the lowest, and on the right by the highest values 
that were elicited (Source: Krayer von Krauss et
al., (2004)). 
uncertainty (using the scale described in Figure 3.2), the “sensitivity” of the assessment 
to the element (Figure 3.3) and the “influence” of this uncertainty, which was 
calculated by taking the square root of the product of the level and the sensitivity         
(I = (L x S)½).
Figure 3.4 is divided into eight categories, all pertaining to model locations for the 
influence diagram that was shown to the experts:   
1. Choice of the processes; 
2. Choice of the parameters; 
3. Knowledge of weed and crop 
management practices; 
4. Knowledge of compatibility of 
GM crop with wild relatives; 
5. Knowledge of seed bank 
parameters of herbicide tolerant 
(HT) volunteers and hybrids; 
6. Knowledge of fitness 
parameters of herbicide tolerant 
volunteers and hybrids; 
7. Knowledge of sensitivity to 
alternative means of weed 
management; 
8. Overall conclusion of the risk 
assessment.  
The first two categories in the Figure 
focus on the context and model 
structure locations.  They illustrate 
the results for the “choice of the 
processes” and the “choice of the 
parameters” to include in the 
influence diagram (i.e., to consider 
in order to assess the risk).  The aim 
of these questions was to determine 
the level of uncertainty 
characterizing the choice of which 
processes and parameters are 
important to consider in the cause-
effect relationship leading to the 
potential impact. The next five 
categories in Figure 3.4 deal with the 
parameters considered influential in 
the risk assessment: the weed and 
crop management practices observed 
by farmers; the compatibility of the 
GM crop with wild relatives; the 
seed bank and fitness parameters of 
tolerant volunteers and hybrids; and 
the sensitivity of tolerant volunteers 
and hybrids to alternative means of 
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weed management.  For each of these parameters, the Figure shows the level of 
uncertainty characterizing expert knowledge of the parameter, how sensitive the 
conclusion of the risk assessment is to changes in the value of the parameter, and what 
the influence of the uncertainty is on the conclusion?  Finally, the last category in 
Figure 3.4 shows the level of uncertainty characterizing the overall conclusion of the 
risk assessment.  Again, only point estimates were elicited from the experts.  In the 
Figure, the solid symbols denote the average of the individual point estimates obtained. 
They are bounded on the left by the lowest, and on the right by the highest values that 
were elicited.   
Table V shows the results of the assessment of the “Nature” of uncertainty. Here 
“stochastic uncertainty” is uncertainty due to the inherent variability of the phenomena 
being considered, and epistemological uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge.  The 
values shown in the Table indicate the number of experts who thought that the 
uncertainty they had identified was predominantly due to the type of uncertainty in 
question (variability or epistemological uncertainty).  The results suggest that 
additional research could potentially reduce the uncertainty surrounding the 
compatibility of the GM crop with wild relatives and the fitness parameters of herbicide 
tolerant volunteers and hybrids.  The reason that not all rows sum to 7 is that some 
experts preferred not to express themselves on issues clearly outside their field of 
expertise 
Table. V  Results of the assessment of the Nature of uncertainty, the number of 
experts describing an uncertainty as predominantly due to variability or lack of 
knowledge (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004)). 
Element of Influence 
Diagram 
Stochastic 
Uncertainty 
Epistemological 
Uncertainty 
1.Choice of processes to 
consider (model structure) 3 3 
2.Choice of parameters to 
consider (model structure) 5 1 
3.Weed and crop 
management practices 6 1 
4.Compatibility with  
wild relatives 2 5 
5.Seed bank parameters 4 2 
6.Fitness parameters 2 5 
7.Sensitivity to alternative 
means of weed management 3 2 
As can be seen in Figure 3.4, the highest levels of uncertainty were attributed to the 
knowledge of the parameters “compatibility with wild relatives”, “seed bank 
parameters” and “fitness parameters”.  This is consistent with the results of the 
Assumptions Analysis and the Evaluation of Empirical Information, which both 
indicated that more research was needed on the ability of potential hybrids to 
perpetuate themselves.  This would seem to be supported by the results shown in Table 
V, where it can be seen that epistemological uncertainty is dominating in the case of the 
parameters “compatibility with wild relatives” and “fitness parameters”.  This indicates 
that the majority of the experts felt that the uncertainty that they had identified in these 
areas was predominantly due to a lack of scientific knowledge. 
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The results of the sensitivity assessment indicate that the experts think that the 
parameter “sensitivity [of tolerant volunteers and hybrids] to alternative means of weed 
management” is one of the most critical parameters for the conclusion of the risk 
assessment.  This essentially means that if alternative weed management methods 
proved to be ineffective at controlling glufosinate tolerant volunteer plants, there would 
be an impact on agricultural and cultivation practices.  In Table V, it can be seen that a 
large majority of the experts interviewed considered that the uncertainty characterizing 
weed and crop management practices is dominated by variability.  This is consistent 
with the fact that this parameter is highly dependent on human behaviour, which is 
known to be very variable.     
In Figure 3.4, it is interesting to note that while the experts tended to rate the 
uncertainty around many of the individual model locations to be in the mid-range of the 
Level scale, they nonetheless rated the uncertainty of the overall conclusion of the risk 
assessment to be in the low range of the Level scale.  It can also be seen that in most 
cases there is a wide range between the lowest and the highest responses received, 
which is indicative of the diversity of expert opinions on particular issues.  This 
diversity is not unusual for expert elicitation.  As has been observed in other expert 
elicitation studies (Morgan and Keith, 1995; Keith, 1996; Stirling and Mayer, 2001), 
the quantitative results of the elicitation display a much richer diversity of expert 
opinion than the risk assessments published by regulatory authorities.   
For a variety of reasons, different experts can interpret the same question differently.  
Many of the tools used to assess uncertainty, for example the scale used to assess the 
Level of uncertainty, were new to the experts.  Although care was taken to explain the 
Level scale to the experts before they responded, the novelty of the concepts involved 
may have lead some experts to ignore the distinctions between the categories on the 
scale and simply respond with a scale rating based on some personal scale.  Similarly, it 
cannot be ruled out that ambiguity in the questions may have lead to different 
interpretations, or that personal biases may have had an influence.   
Future investigations may reduce interpretive flexibility by further characterizing the 
terminology used, e.g. by using generic descriptive formula to describe terms such as 
‘large’ and ‘small’.  As well, the sample of experts could be expanded in order to focus 
explicitly on documenting the diversity of expert opinion.  In the present study, the 
expert sample included seven experts, four of whom are research scientists employed 
by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.  The presence of additional experts from other 
organizations (e.g. academia, regulatory agencies, interest groups, and growers) would 
provide a more complete picture of the diversity of opinions.  Increased focus on 
documenting the diversity of opinion may also make it possible to determine to what 
extent divergences of opinion might be artefacts of research design (for instance 
relating to inconsistent interpretations or framings), or to what extent these might 
sustain a conclusion that underlying collective uncertainties significantly exceed those 
typically entertained by individual experts. 
Figure 3.5 shows the mean and variance of the responses given by each expert on the 
questions pertaining to the level of uncertainty.  As can be seen in the Figure, some 
experts consistently rated the level of uncertainty to be on the lower end of the scale 
(known outcomes, known probability), while the majority consistently rated the level of 
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uncertainty to be in the mid-range (known outcomes, unknown probability).  The fact 
that individual experts varied their responses only relatively little may be due to the 
perspective each of the experts has on uncertainty, but it may also be due to a 
phenomenon known as “anchoring”.  Anchoring is the phenomenon whereby  experts 
tend to unduly favour a particular value, for example the first value given or a 
conventional value (van der Sluijs et al., 1998).  None of the experts seemed to be 
worried about unknown outcomes (Level t 0.7).  This could be attributable to a fear of 
appearing ignorant, or less of an expert, on behalf of the experts. 
3.5.6 Consistency 
To a certain extent, consistency tests can be used to test the degree of comprehension 
the experts had of the questions they were asked.  Figure 3.6 illustrates the results of the 
consistency tests that were performed on some of the experts interviewed, in the form 
of an index of uncertainty influence versus the willingness to pay to eliminate 
uncertainty.  Willingness to pay is based on the number of poker chips the experts were 
willing to “invest” into research on a particular element of the influence diagram in 
order to eliminate the uncertainty on that element.  One hundred chips were given to the 
experts to apportion among research needs.  A consistent expert would be expected to 
allot more chips to elements for which the influence of uncertainty is large (i.e., high 
levels of uncertainty and sensitivity), and for which he/she considers the uncertainty to 
be reducible.  As can be seen in Figure 3.6, aside from the fact that experts were 
generally willing to invest more into research on model components where epistemic 
uncertainty dominated, consistency was not a major feature of the responses given by 
the experts.  This could be an indication that the experts did not fully understand the 
Figure 3.5  Mean and variance of the responses of 
individual experts on the level of uncertainty (Source: 
Krayer von Krauss et al., 2004)).
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questions they were asked, or that they based the allotment of their chips on decision 
criteria other than the influence of uncertainty, e.g. personal research interests or their 
estimate of the expected return on the investment.  Experts understand the research 
opportunities in their own area best, and have a vested interest in wanting to pursue 
them.   
Although the methodology used in this investigation and the results reported should 
contribute to fostering a constructive dialogue on uncertainty in the risk assessment of 
GM crops, it is unlikely they will suffice to address the main public concern in relation 
to GMOs – the unanticipated catastrophe.  While this assessment focused primarily on 
“known” uncertainties, public concern focuses instead on the acknowledged and 
unacknowledged limitations of science and the belief that scientific reversals are bound 
to occur (Levy and Derby, 2000; Wynne et al., 2000; Jiles, 2003). The public looks 
retrospectively at scientific claims and remembers the ones that didn’t prove true (such 
as radiation and DDT are harmless).  This reinforces their scepticism, especially when 
the consequences are perceived as irreversible and potentially grave.  Because of this, it 
is not likely that the mere act of performing uncertainty analyses such as this one will 
suffice to address public concerns about the risks of GMCs.  Nonetheless, the results 
obtained are a good starting point for deliberation on the uncertainties in risk 
assessments of GMCs.  Furthermore, by including a broader diversity of stakeholders in 
the study, a broader range of perspectives may be made obvious. 
Scientific uncertainties can be managed by conducting basic research, by implementing 
rigorous monitoring programs, and by re-assessing individual cases as new information 
becomes available.  For this to occur, policy makers must be aware of uncertainty and 
develop their policies accordingly. Explorations of the scientific and economic 
uncertainties associated with regulatory decisions on GMOs, such as the work 
Figure. 3.6  Consistency index between influence of 
uncertainty and willingness to pay to eliminate uncertainty.  
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presented here, should help to reduce public concerns.  Issues uncovered in such 
explorations could contribute to identifying goals for long-term monitoring programs 
and clarifying research priorities.  Furthermore, cross-expert uncertainty analyses such 
as the one performed here could provide structure to characterizations of uncertainty 
such as those required by EU directive 2001/18/EEC.   
3.6 Conclusion 
The results of the uncertainty analysis reveal three issues of potential concern that are 
currently left outside the scope of the risk assessment of herbicide tolerant oilseed 
crops.  These are the potential loss of the agronomic and environmental benefits of 
GLYPHOSATE due to the combined problems of herbicide tolerant canola and wheat 
volunteers, the growing problem of seed lot contamination, and potential market 
impacts.  The results also draw attention to two areas where knowledge is lacking, 
which are: the occurrence of hybrids between canola and wild relatives and the ability 
of the hybrids to perpetuate themselves in nature; and the fate of the herbicide tolerance 
genes in soil and their interaction with soil micro fauna. These results should be helpful 
in establishing goals for long-term monitoring programs, in setting research priorities, 
and in increasing the transparency of the risk assessment process. 
Future investigations may reduce interpretive flexibility by further characterizing the 
terminology used, e.g. by using generic descriptive formula to describe the various 
levels of uncertainty on the levels axis.  As well, the sample of experts could be 
expanded in order to focus explicitly on documenting the diversity of expert opinion.   
The experts who participated in this study did not dwell on “surprise” outcomes. This is 
in contrast to the alleged public preoccupation with risks as yet unidentified. Because of 
this, it is not likely that the mere act of performing uncertainty analyses such as this one 
will suffice to address public concerns about the risks of GMCs.  Nonetheless, the 
results obtained are a good starting point for deliberation on the uncertainties in risk 
assessments of GMCs.  Furthermore, by including a broader sample of stakeholders in 
the study, a broader diversity of perspectives may be documented, which could 
highlight additional areas of ignorance. 
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4 Uncertainty characterising  
the knowledge of Transgene Silencing 
4.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the application of the W&H integrated 
uncertainty analysis framework through expert elicitations aimed at obtaining 
qualitative and quantitative information on the uncertainty characterizing a basic 
scientific problem: transgene silencing in genetically modified plants. The elicitations 
were conducted during the spring of 2005, and the results will be reported in Krayer 
von Krauss et al., (in preparation).   
4.2 Background on the case study 
In genetic engineering, alien genes, referred to as transgenes, are inserted into 
conventional plant species to create genetically modified plants.  The level at which the 
transgene is expressed in the new plant (i.e., the transformant) is unpredictable and 
varies from one transformant to another.  Sometimes the newly inserted transgenes are 
not expressed at all. This can be due to a phenomenon referred to as transgene 
silencing. Transgene silencing is an interesting phenomenon for several reasons. First, 
the mechanisms underlying transgene silencing are still not completely understood by 
scientists (Matzke et al., 2004; Schubert et al., 2004; Fagard and Vaucheret, 2000; 
DeBlock and Debrouwer, 1993), thereby highlighting the limitations in knowledge of 
how genes operate when they are placed into a new genome.  Second, there are 
situations where transgene silencing can be unfortunate, e.g. in the case where, in order 
to avoid the transfer of transgenes via pollen spread, plants have been modified to make 
them sterile (Doerfler et al., 1997).  In this case, silencing of the gene that causes 
sterility leads to the production of pollen, which could then lead to the unwanted spread 
of transgenes to wild or non-transgenic plants. Different levels of gene expression may 
disrupt the cell metabolism, hence causing changes in the functional properties of the 
organism (Inose and Murata, 1995). Potential secondary effects include changed levels 
of bioactive compounds in the organism and altered levels of antinutrients as well as 
potential allergens and toxins (Lappé et al., 1999; Novak and Haslberger, 2000).  Under 
the recent EU legislation on the risk assessment of genetically modified organisms 
(2001/18/EEC), gene silencing is considered a mechanism that can lead to the 
occurrence of adverse effects and the stability of the transgene should therefore be 
reported on in the approval process (2002/623/EC).    
4.3 Selection of experts 
The main criterion used to select the experts was their familiarity with the case study.  
All of the experts interviewed were either currently involved in research activities 
pertaining to transgene silencing, or had been within the recent past.  Table VI presents 
the affiliations of the experts interviewed as well as key words describing their area of 
expertise. Although some effort was made to examine an envelope of salient 
perspectives by drawing on expertise in both academia and industry, only researchers 
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from academia responded to the invitation to participate in the study.  Two 
representatives of a non-profit, public interest research organization were consulted 
informally in order to receive feedback on the study design and identify their concerns 
in relation to transcriptional gene silencing. Unfortunately, they did not feel that their 
level of expertise on the specific topic of transcriptional gene silencing was sufficient 
for them to be considered “experts” in the context of this study. 
Table VI Experts interviewed in this study. (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (in preparation)). 
Experts Affiliation Expertise 
1
Matzke Lab, Gregor Mendel 
Institute for Molecular Plant 
Biology, Austria 
RNA silencing, epigenetics, DNA-methylation, Arabidopsis 
2
Molecular Plant Virology 
Group, Institute of Botany, 
University of Basel, 
Switzerland 
Molecular biology, virology, biotechnology, plant research 
3
Molecular Plant Virology 
Group, Institute of Botany, 
University of Basel, 
Switzerland 
Plant molecular biology, virology, silencing, epigenetics, 
biotechnology. 
4
Institute of Cell and Molecular 
Biology, University of 
Edinburgh, Scotland 
Transgene silencing, control of transgene expression, histone 
methylation, gene regulation, plant development. 
5
Laboratory of Phytopathology, 
Wageningen University, The 
Netherlands 
Plant pathology, Arabidopsis biochemistry, proteasis. 
NGO 
Representatives 
1 EcoNexus, Brighton,  United Kingdom 
Plant biology, molecular biology, virology, genetics and RNA 
biology 
2
EcoNexus, Brighton,  
United Kingdom Plant biology, plant molecular genetics, Arabidopsis
4.4 Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this study was very similar to the one presented in section 
3.4.  As in Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004), the institutional context (i.e., uncertainty 
analysis or peer review on a decision support study) in which the W&H framework is 
intended to be applied was simulated by having experts respond to a number of 
questions that implicitly reflected the concepts put forth in the W&H framework.  Here 
again, the goal was to communicate the W&H framework and elicit the experts’ 
knowledge of uncertainty, without intimidating or confusing the experts by an 
overwhelming number of new concepts.   
Each interview was conducted in four basic parts as follows: 
i. Review of a proposed influence diagram (system model); 
ii. Assessment of level and nature of uncertainty; 
iii. Further description of uncertainty; 
iv. Surprise analysis; 
v. Consistency test. 
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4.4.1 Model locations and structure  
The first part of the interview focused on the locations dimension of uncertainty.  The 
goal was to inventory the important model locations, as well as to identify disagreement 
regarding the model locations, in view of diagnosing model structure uncertainty.  The 
experts were presented with an influence diagram (see Figure 4.1) illustrating the 
cause-effect relationships scientist suspect are involved in transgene silencing. The 
diagram was developed by inferring on the basis of scientific journal articles, as well as 
with the assistance of an expert in the field 7.   
Scientists distinguish between two different types of gene silencing:  transcriptional 
gene silencing (TGS) and post-transcriptional gene silencing (PTGS).  TGS results 
from the inactivation of the promoter (T-DNA), while PTGS occurs when the 
promoters are active and the genes transcribe, but the mRNAs fail to accumulate.  In 
order to simplify the case study, the choice was made to focus mainly on TGS.  
However, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, the two phenomena are related to one-another 
and to some extent, one cannot avoid discussing PTGS, as scientist suspect that it may 
influence the occurrence of TGS.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the three principle causal 
pathways scientists suspect lead to the occurrence of TGS: 
x Repeat-induced DNA methylation; 
x Chromosomal environment of the transgene;   
x Influence of Post-transcriptional gene silencing (PTGS). 
A more detailed explanation of these causal pathways is provided in Box 1 of Krayer 
von Krauss et al. (in preparation).   
The experts were asked to comment on whether the diagram mentioned all of the 
parameters and processes that they thought were key to understanding transcriptional 
gene silencing, and on whether they thought the diagram contained any superfluous 
elements.   
4.4.2 Level and nature of uncertainty 
The second part of the interview focused on the level of uncertainty characterising each 
of the model locations illustrated in Figure 4.1.  In the investigation performed by 
Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004), the scale presented in Figure 3.2 was used to assess 
the level of uncertainty. One of the conclusions of chapter 3 of this dissertation was that 
consistency in expert responses could perhaps be increased by using generic descriptive 
formula to further characterize the terminology used to designate the different levels of 
uncertainty.  On this basis, the scale presented in Figure 3.2 was abandoned in the 
current investigation, in favour of the pedigree matrix presented in Table VII.  The 
criteria presented in Table VII were developed for the purpose of identifying the level 
of uncertainty.   
(7) The influence diagram was developed with the help of Prof. Reidunn B. Aalen of the Department of Molecular 
Biosciences, University of Oslo.
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The criteria were explained to the experts and they were asked to apply them to 
evaluate each component of Figure 4.1.  The level of uncertainty was determined on the 
basis of the scores obtained, according to the scale presented in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table VII.  In this way, the level of uncertainty was assessed for: i) the structure of the 
overall model; ii) the structure of each of the three sub-models identified above; and iii) 
each of the individual components of the model (represented by ellipses in Figure 4.1).  
Criteria 1, 2 and 3 were applied to evaluate model structure, while the fourth criterion 
was applied to evaluate individual model components. 
Experts were then asked to specify whether the uncertainty identified was 
predominantly due to natural variability in the phenomenon being observed (stochastic 
uncertainty), or if it was mainly due to limitations in expert knowledge or in the 
methods available for studying the phenomenon (epistemic uncertainty).    
The second part of the interview was ended by asking the experts to assess the 
sensitivity of the model to errors in the structure of the model, sub-model or model 
component, using the scale presented in Figure. 4.2.  The scale is a slightly modified 
version of the scale used for this purpose by Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004), presented 
in Figure 3.3.  On the scale, a 0 implies that a large change in the element would have 
only a small effect on the conclusion, a 0.5 implies that a change would have a 
proportional effect, and a 1 implies that a small change would have a large effect.  The 
scale was explained to the experts and they were asked to assess the sensitivity of the 
conclusion to changes in each of the key parameters and processes identified in the 
influence diagram.   
Table VII.  Criteria for evaluation of the level of uncertainty. 
Evaluation Criteria Level of 
Uncertainty Score 
1. Level of 
theoretical 
understanding 
2. Level of empirical 
information 
3. Ability to identify the 
model structure 
4.  Ability to attribute 
a value to the model 
component. 
Determinism 0 Perfect understanding of the system. 
Perfect information on the 
system. 
We know exactly what the 
model structure is. 
We know exactly what 
the value will be. 
Statistical 
Uncertainty 1
We know in great detail 
how the system works. 
We have a great deal of 
information on the entire 
system. 
We know the range of 
possible candidate models 
and their associated 
probabilities. 
We know the range of 
possible values and their 
associated probabilities. 
2
We understand how the 
main mechanisms of 
the system work. 
We have a considerable 
amount of information on 
the system. 
We know the range of 
possible  candidate models 
and we are able to rank them 
ordinally based on 
plausibility. 
We know the range of 
possible  values and we 
are able to rank them 
ordinally based on 
plausibility. 
Scenario 
Uncertainty 
3 We only understand parts of the system. 
We have some information 
on the system, but it is 
limited. 
We know the range of 
possible candidate models, 
but cannot rank them. 
We know the range of 
possible values, but 
cannot rank them. 
4
We have some clues as 
to how the system 
works. 
We have only very little 
information on the system. 
We can imagine some 
candidate models, but it is 
likely there are other model 
candidates of which we are 
unaware. 
We can imagine some 
values, but we don't 
know the bounds of the  
range of possible values. 
Identified 
Ignorance
5 We don't understand the system at all. 
We don’t have any 
information on the system. 
We cannot imagine the  
model structure. 
We cannot imagine the  
values possible. 
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4.4.3 Exploring uncertainty 
As was explained in section 3.4 of this dissertation, Krayer von Krauss et al. (2004) 
sought to raise awareness of the various sources of uncertainty that can characterise a 
risk assessment, prior to proceeding to the assessment of the level of uncertainty.  In the 
current investigation, an attempt was made to examine how/if the level of uncertainty 
identified by the experts would influence the way in which they chose to communicate 
the uncertainty diagnosed.  In view of this, the “awareness raising” exercises had to be 
omitted from the interview due to time limitations.  Following their assessment of the 
level of uncertainty, the experts were asked to describe the uncertainty identified in 
terms of a further set of pedigree criteria and a scale of levels of uncertainty.  In order 
to maintain the focus on the use of the W&H framework to diagnose uncertainty, this 
part of the study conducted by Krayer von Krauss and colleagues will not be elaborated 
on here.  Readers are referred to Krayer von Krauss et al., (in preparation) for details of 
the approach and the results obtained.   
4.4.4 Surprise analysis 
The third part of the interview was aimed at fostering a dialogue on issues that may 
have been left out of the assessment and potential surprises (i.e., context uncertainty).  
Thus, the experts were asked questions aimed at identifying potential unanticipated or 
indirect effects associated to gene silencing.  The experts were also presented with a 
scenario intended to help them reflect on potential surprises. The scenario question was 
as follows:    
“Imagine you have been awarded a sizeable budget to conduct 
research into transgene silencing and conduct an extensive research 
program lasting several years.  Can you think of a result of this 
research that would really surprise you?” 
4.4.5 Consistency test 
Finally, the interviews were ended with a test aimed at verifying how internally 
consistent the experts were in assessing the uncertainty level and the sensitivity 
associated with various elements of the influence diagram.  Experts were given 100 
poker chips and asked to allocate a fixed number of chips to each of the key elements 
of the influence diagram that they had assessed previously, to indicate how much they 
would be willing to invest to completely eliminate the uncertainty on that aspect of the 
influence diagram.     
Large 
variation has 
small effect 
Small 
variation has 
large effect 
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
1:1
Figure 4.2.  Scale used to assess sensitivity (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al.,
(in preparation)).
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4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Model locations and structure 
The majority of the experts felt that the influence diagram presented in Figure 4.1 
represented the main processes and parameters describing transcriptional gene 
silencing.  However, the interviews did reveal certain areas where the experts disagreed 
on how some of the components of the diagram were related to one another (i.e., model 
structure uncertainty).  The areas of disagreement concerned the following components 
of the diagram:   
x post-transcriptional gene silencing (ellipse 11); 
x position effects (ellipse 10); 
x DNA-DNA interactions (ellipse4); 
x direct-repeat DNA structures (ellipse 2); 
x recognition factors (ellipse 5).   
x dsRNA and aberrant RNA (ellipse 3). 
One of the experts interviewed felt that the influence of post-transcriptional silencing 
would be best represented by connecting PTGS (ellipse 11) to dsRNA/aberrant RNA 
(ellipse 3).  The expert explained that siRNA derived from transgenes is incorporated 
into the cytoplasmic effector complex RISC, which is targeted in sequence-dependent 
manner to homologous mRNA, resulting in its cleavage. According to the expert, 
published results indicate that transgenes subjected to posttranscriptional regulation can 
also be targeted for DNA methylation, suggesting that cytoplasmic and nuclear events 
may be linked via a common inducer, which is dsRNA (ellipse 3) and/or small RNAs 
(ellipse 6).   
Another expert suggested that the influence of position effects (ellipse 10) and PTGS 
(ellipse 11) would be best illustrated by connecting these ellipses to the box illustrating 
histone modifications (ellipse 8) and DNA methylation (ellipse 9), rather than to the 
TGS ellipse. The expert explained that the possibility that position effects could 
influence TGS is only based on educated guesses, while there are firmly established 
findings that position effects play only a minor role.  According to the expert, there are 
firmly established findings that TGS plays a major role in genome defence, e.g. 
transposon silencing, and it is beyond reasonable doubt that this is correlated to histone 
modifications (ellipse 8) and DNA methylation (ellipse 9). There is a clear showing that 
PTGS (ellipse 11) can cause DNA methylation (ellipse 9).  Although the potential 
association between PTGS (ellipse 11) and histone modification (ellipse 8) is only 
speculative at this point, it seems very likely.   
One expert suggested that position effects (ellipse 10) should also be linked to SiRNA 
(ellipse 6).  The expert explained that factors which can contribute to silencing due to 
position effects are sharp changes of CG content at the insertions sites, presence of 
short repeats and vicinity to transposable elements. However, positions effects can also 
include the presence of insertion site-located regulatory elements, which might result in 
the unintended transcription of parts of the transgene, such as transgene-based 
promoters. Unintended transcription and thus production of aberrant RNA or antisense 
RNAs (ellipse 3) might result in the formation of siRNAs (ellipse 6) and silencing via 
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RNA/DNA interactions (ellipse 7). 
Three experts suggested that direct-repeat DNA structures (ellipse 2) could possibly 
have an influence on dsRNA/aberrant RNAs (ellipse 3).  They argued that to date, there 
is little evidence that direct-repeat DNA structures (ellipse 2) can cause TGS (caused 
by the structure itself), and therefore the possible links to dsRNA/aberrant RNA (ellipse 
3) and recognition factors (ellipse 5) are merely based on educated guesses. One of 
these three experts indicated that direct-repeat DNA structures (ellipse 2) could also be 
related to DNA-DNA interactions (ellipse 4), in that it is conceivable that if direct 
repeat DNA structure influence TGS at all, DNA-DNA interactions occur. The same 
expert pointed out that the possibility that recognition factors (ellipse 5) play a role in 
inducing TGS is base on crude speculation.  However, if they do play a role, it is likely 
that they also intervene in the relationship between RNA-DNA interactions (ellipse 7) 
and the histone modifications (ellipse 8) and DNA methylation (ellipse 9) box.  
Two experts suggested that dsRNA and aberrant RNA (ellipse 3) should be represented 
individually by separate ellipses and that an arrow should emanate from the histone 
modifications (ellipse 8) and DNA methylation (ellipse 9) box and point to the aberrant 
RNA ellipse.  The aberrant RNA ellipse should then be connected to the dsRNA, which 
would retain its current position in the diagram (ellipse 3).  The experts explained that 
methylation at asymmetrical sites (CNN, where N is any nucleotide but G) is believed 
to be maintained by de novo methylatransferases DRM1 and DRM2 guided by RNA 
signals, possibly siRNA (ellipse 6) or long dsRNA (ellipse 3). The RNA signals to 
maintain complete methylation pattern may be produced by a recently discovered, 
plant-specific RNA polymerase IV (Pol IV). It is speculated that Pol IV may 
specifically recognize methylated DNA as a template and transcribe it into aberrant 
RNA (ellipse 3a).  This aberrant RNA might be converted to dsRNA (ellipse 3B) by 
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RDR2).  The resulting dsRNA will be cleaved by 
Dicer (DCL3) into siRNAs that will target cognate DNA for de novo methylation (at 
both asymmetric and symmetric sites). 
4.5.2 Level and nature of uncertainty 
Tables VIII and IX present the results of the assessment of the level of uncertainty 
characterizing the influence diagram (Figure 4.1), based on the pedigree criteria 
presented in Table VII.  Only point estimates were elicited.  In Table VIII, the first 
column lists the sub-models presented in the diagram, and the next four columns show 
the experts’ assessment of how well each of the sub-models scored on the various 
criteria.  Bold numbers are the average of all responses.  The fifth column shows the 
overall strength, a cross row ranking tool, calculated as the average of the scores on that 
model structure.  Bold numbers indicate the average of all the average responses.  They 
are flanked on the left by the average of the lowest scores, and on the right by the 
average of the highest scores that were given. In Table IX, the first column contains the 
individual model components assessed, while the next column shows the experts’ 
assessment of how well the model components scored on the criterion used.  Here 
again, bold numbers are the average of all responses.  In both Tables, the final column 
shows the level of uncertainty, determined by comparing the average overall strength to 
the scale shown in the first two columns of Table VII. 
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Table IX.  Results of the evaluation of level of uncertainty on model 
components (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (in preparation)).    
Specific Components in Diagram 
Ability to attribute a value 
to the model component. 
(0-5)
Level of 
Uncertainty 
1- Inverted Repeat DNA Structures 0, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1,3 Statistical Uncertainty 
2- Direct Repeat DNA Structures 1, 1.5, 2.2, 2.5, 3, 3 Scenario Uncertainty 
3- dsRNA  or aberrant RNA 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 3 Statistical Uncertainty 
4- DNA-DNA interactions 3, 3, 3.7, 4, 4, 4.5 Scenario Uncertainty 
5- Recognition Factors 3, 3.8, 4, 4, 4 Identified Ignorance 
6- SiRNA 0, 1, 1, 1, 1.4, 4 Statistical Uncertainty 
7- RNA-DNA Interactions 1, 2, 2, 2.2, 3, 3 Scenario Uncertainty 
8- Histone Modification 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.6, 4 Statistical Uncertainty 
9- DNA Methylation 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2 Statistical Uncertainty 
Table VIII.  Results of the Evaluation of Level of Uncertainty on Model Structure.  
(Source: Krayer von Krauss et al., (in preparation)).   
Evaluation Scores Elicited 
(0-5)Model Structure  Level of theoretical 
understanding 
Level of empirical 
information 
Ability to identify  
the model structure 
Overall 
Strength 
Level of 
Uncertainty 
Overall 
Model 1, 2, 2.3, 2.5, 3, 3 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3 1, 1, 1.9, 2, 2.5, 3 1– 2.1 –3 
Scenario 
Uncertainty 
Repeat-induced 
DNA  
methylation sub-
model 
1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5, 3, 3 1, 2, 2, 2.2, 3, 3 2, 2, 2, 2, 2.3, 3 1,3– 2.3 –3 Scenario Uncertainty 
Chromosomal 
environment  
of the transgene 
sub-model 
1, 1, 1.8, 2, 2.5, 2.5 1, 2, 2, 2.3, 3, 3.5 0, 0.5, 1.8, 2, 3, 3.5 0.7– 2.0 –3.2 Scenario Uncertainty 
PTGS sub-model 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4 0.5, 1, 1.5, 1.7, 2.5, 3 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4 0.7– 1.9 –3.7 Scenario Uncertainty 
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As can be seen in Table VIII, the structure of the overall model presented in Figure 4.1, 
as well as the structure of the sub-models, are characterized by scenario uncertainty.  
To a certain extent, this concords well with the fact that, as was illustrated by the 
disagreement revealed in the assessment of the completeness of the influence diagram, 
there are competing scientific interpretations of the mechanisms leading to 
transcriptional gene silencing. Given the comment made by one expert in the first part 
of the interview, to the effect that the possibility that position effects could influence 
TGS is only based on educated guesses, one may have expected that the model 
structure of the chromosomal environment sub-model would be judged more uncertain 
than other sub-models.  This is not reflected in the results. It is however interesting to 
note that there seems to be more disagreement amongst experts regarding the structure 
of the chromosome environment and PTGS sub-models, than there is in the case of the 
repeat-induced DNA methylation sub-model and the overall model.   
The results presented in Table IX indicate that two model components, DNA-DNA 
interactions and recognition factors, are characterized by a high level of uncertainty.  
This concords with the comments made by some of the experts during the assessment 
of the completeness of the influence diagram.   
Figure 4.4 shows the relative level of uncertainty, the sensitivity of the model (Figure 
4.1), as well as the “influence” of the uncertainty identified. The relative level of 
uncertainty was calculated by dividing the overall strength scores presented in Table 
VIII, and the min, max and mean score presented in Table IX, by the maximum 
achievable score (i.e., divided by 5).  The influence of the uncertainty was calculated by 
taking the square root of the product of the relative level of uncertainty and the 
sensitivity (I = (L/5 x S)1/2).  In the Figure, solid symbols denote mean values.  They 
are bounded on the left by the lowest, and on the right by the highest, values.  
Table X presents the responses given by each expert on the questions pertaining to the 
level of uncertainty, with the mean and standard deviation of these responses.  As can 
be seen in the Table, all of the experts interviewed varied their responses across the 
spectrum of possible answers, but there seems to be a tendency for some experts to 
anchor their response on certain values.  Furthermore, expert 5 generally seemed to 
judge the level of uncertainty to be notably higher than what his colleagues judged it to 
be, which could be an indication of difference perspectives on uncertainty.   
Table X Responses by individual experts on level of uncertainty.
Expert Responses on level of uncertainty Mean; Standard Deviation 
Expert 1  0.5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2.5, 3 1.5; 0.8 
Expert 2 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 4 1.4; 1.4 
Expert 3 0, 0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4 1.8; 1.3 
Expert 4 0.5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.5, 3, 3, 4.5 1.8; 1.3 
Expert 5 0, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4 3.6; 1.2 
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Level, Sensitivity, and  Influence of Uncertainty
Overall model 
Repeat-induced DNA 
methylation sub-model 
Chromosomal environment 
of the transgene sub-model 
PTGS sub-model 
Inverted repeat  
DNA structures  
Direct repeat  
DNA structures 
dsRNA or  
aberrant RNA 
DNA-DNA interactions 
Recognition factors 
SiRNA
RNA-DNA interactions 
Histone modification 
DNA methylation 
Legend:  Ɣ = Level     Ŷ = Sensitivity   Ƈ = Influence
Figure 4.4  Results of assessment of the relative level, the sensitivity, and the 
influence of uncertainty (I = (L/5 x S)1/2).  Only point estimates were elicited. 
Solid symbols denote mean values.  They are bounded on the left by the lowest, 
and on the right by the highest, values (Source: Krayer von Krauss et al., (in 
preparation)).
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Table XI presents the results of the assessment of the nature of uncertainty.  Here, 
stochastic uncertainty is uncertainty due to the inherent variability of the phenomena 
under consideration, and epistemic uncertainty is due to limitations in our knowledge.  
The values shown in the Table indicate the number of experts who thought that the 
uncertainty they had identified was predominantly due to the type of uncertainty in 
question (stochastic or epistemic uncertainty).  The results suggest that it could be 
possible to reduce uncertainty by conducting additional research into the model 
components Inverted repeat DNA structures, Direct Repeat DNA structures, DNA-
DNA interactions, and Recognition factors.  Conversely, as the uncertainty 
characterizing the model component dsRNA or aberrant RNA is dominated by natural 
variability, it is unlikely that it can be reduced much further by conducting additional 
research.  Not all rows sum to 5 due to the fact that one expert preferred not to express 
himself on Recognition factors, considering this outside of his field of expertise. 
Table XI. Results of assessment of nature of uncertainty.   
(Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (in preparation)) 
Nature of Uncertainty 
Element of influence diagram Stochastic Epistemic 
Overall model 2 3 
Repeat-induced DNA  
Methylation sub-model  2 3 
Chromosomal environment  
Of the transgene sub-model  2 3 
PTGS sub-model  2 3 
Inverted repeat DNA structures  1 4 
Direct Repeat DNA structures 1 4 
dsRNA  or aberrant RNA 4 1 
DNA-DNA interactions 1 4 
Recognition factors   0 4 
SiRNA 3 2 
RNA-DNA interactions 2 3 
Histone modification 3 2 
DNA methylation 3 2 
4.5.3 Surprise analysis 
Many of the experts interviewed indicated that scientists’ knowledge of the 
mechanisms leading to transcriptional gene silencing is rapidly evolving and that they 
would therefore expect surprise discoveries to take place in the future.   
One expert mentioned that he would be surprised to observe a situation where all of the 
RNA components necessary for repeat-induced DNA methylation to take place were 
present, but silencing does not occur, possibly indicating that environmental conditions 
exercise an influence on this pathway. 
The NGO representatives put forth the following scenario as a possible biosafety risk 
related to gene silencing:
“In order to engineer resistance to a target virus, a viral gene can be 
inserted into a plant. If this gene becomes silenced the plant will be 
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resistant to the virus. When a virus enters the plant this silencing effect 
transfers to the virus- thus preventing infection. In this situation gene 
silencing is used deliberately to induce virus resistance, even though not all 
transformants carrying the gene will be resistant to the virus. 
Safety tests on the crop are done on an uninfected plant in which  
silencing is active, thus little or no transgenic viral protein is being 
produced by the plant. If transgene silencing were unstable, then the viral 
gene would be expressed at a higher (probably much higher) level and one 
could argue that safety tests (e.g. compositional analysis) would no longer 
be valid. 
Secondly, elevated expression of a virus gene may itself constitute a health 
hazard. Viral genes inserted into plants are usually considered safe because 
the protein is expressed at a low level. Low level expression of the 
transgene protein would no longer be a property of the crop if silencing 
was instable /inactivated.” 
While the focus of this study has been on the scenario whereby a transgene intended to 
be expressed is accidentally/unexplainably silenced, the above scenario represents the 
inverse situation, whereby the intention is that the transgene be silenced, but this 
accidentally/unexplainably fails. 
Two experts were questioned on the plausibility of the above scenario, and on whether 
it could be argued that, if scientific knowledge is limited to the extent that silencing 
cannot always be explained, then, conversely, it was not possible to predict the failure 
of intentional silencing in all cases. 
The experts judged the scenario to be plausible.  Due to the many biotic and abiotic 
factors that can lead to suppression of silencing, it is not possible to predict whether 
silencing will be stable in all cases.  However, the experts questioned the extent to 
which the expression of high levels of viral proteins could be considered as a health 
risk.  They felt that if so, many of the conventional fruits and vegetables sold in 
supermarkets would have to be considered hazardous as they likely contain high levels 
of different viruses.   
4.5.4 Consistency 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the results of the consistency tests, in the form of an index of 
uncertainty influence versus the willingness to pay to eliminate uncertainty.  
Willingness to pay is based on the number of poker chips the experts were willing to 
“invest” into research on a particular component of the influence diagram in order to 
completely eliminate the uncertainty on that component.   
One hundred chips were given to the experts to apportion among research needs.  A 
consistent expert would be expected to allot more chips to components for which the 
influence of uncertainty is large (i.e., high levels of uncertainty and sensitivity), and for 
which the uncertainty is predominantly of an epistemic nature.  In Figure 4.5, the dotted 
trendline indicates the trend in how experts invested their chips on model components 
they thought were dominated by epistemic uncertainty. The solid trendline indicates the 
trend in how experts invested their chips on model components they thought were 
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dominated by stochastic uncertainty.  As can be seen in the Figure, apart from the  
trendline indicating that experts would be willing to invest increasing amounts of 
resources as the influence of epistemic uncertainty increases, consistency was not a 
prominent feature of the responses given by the experts.  Thus, the use of generic 
descriptive formula to further characterize the terminology used to designate the 
different levels of uncertainty did not have a significant impact on the consistency with 
witch experts applied the various concepts put forth in Walker et al., (2003).    
4.6 Discussion 
Because it could not be expected that the experts involved in this study were familiar 
with the concepts put forth in the Walker and Harremoës conceptual framework, efforts 
were required to communicate the framework without intimidating or confusing the 
experts, while still obtaining their knowledge of the location, level and nature of 
uncertainty.  For this reason, this study used expert elicitation as a method to coach 
experts through the application of the Walker and Harremoës conceptual framework.  
Ultimately however, it is envisioned that experts providing scientific advice to inform 
policy decisions would receive training with the conceptual framework, such that they 
could use it as a reflexive tool to diagnose and communicate the uncertainty 
characterizing their assessments.  This is what is currently taking place at the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Janssen et al., 2005).  
Figure 4.5  Consistency index between the influence of 
uncertainty and the willingness to pay to eliminate uncertainty 
(Source: Krayer von Krauss et al. (in preparation)). 
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The relative lack of consistency in the responses given by the experts (see Figure 4.5), 
could indicate that the experts did not necessarily fully grasp the concepts put forth in 
the questions they were asked, notwithstanding the fact that generic descriptive formula 
were used to further characterize the terminology.  However, it could also indicate that 
subjective factors had an influence on how the experts responded to the questions.  It 
cannot be ruled out that ambiguity in the questions may have lead to different 
interpretations, or that personal biases may have had an influence.   
As has been observed in other expert elicitation studies (Krayer von Krauss et al., 2004; 
Morgan et al., 2001; Morgan and Keith, 1995; Stirling and Mayer, 2001), the 
quantitative results of the elicitation display a much richer diversity of expert opinion 
than the consensus documents typically published by regulatory authorities.  In many 
cases, these documents are written in such a way that they mask the diversity of expert 
opinions.  Moreover, because this form of “one-way” communication (i.e., where the 
intended audience does not participate) is necessarily constrained by the limited 
spectrum of symbolic resources available for written communication, it often masks the 
diversity of perceptions associated with words such as “likely”, “uncertainty” and 
“ignorance”.  Thus, while the impression of a consensus may be conveyed, reality is 
such that each of the experts contributing to a given assessment, and each of the policy 
makers and stakeholders reading it, may have a different interpretation of the message 
communicated in the document. This has been demonstrated well by empirical research 
into risk communication and experience in practice (Patt and Schrag, 2003; Patt and 
Dessai, 2005; Morgan, 1998; Wallsten et al., 1986).    
The ambiguity of the results generated by an uncertainty analysis such as the one 
performed in this study may lead some to question the usefulness of investing the 
efforts required to perform the analysis.  However, it is important to recall that the goal 
of performing such analyses is to provide substance to a deliberative decision making 
process, in view of fostering reflexivity. Within a deliberative policy making process, 
the interpretive flexibility offered by qualitative descriptors of uncertainty is not 
necessarily a negative thing. Although the use of relative terminology such as 
“considerable”, “good/bad”, “likely”, “uncertain” and “ignorance” may be a source of 
ambiguity, it also forces stakeholders to deliberate on the meaning of these terms, and 
can thereby help bridge the diversity of positions and framings held by the various 
actors involved (Shackley and Wynne, 1997; Star and Griesemer, 1989; Eisenberg, 
1984).
4.7 Conclusion 
The results of this study reveal that some aspects of the scientific knowledge of 
transcriptional gene silencing are characterized by high levels of uncertainty.  The 
results show that their are competing hypotheses regarding some of the cause-effect 
relationships leading to the phenomenon (model structure uncertainty).  Furthermore, 
the model components “DNA-DNA interactions” and “Recognition factors” were 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty.  As a large majority of the experts 
interviewed agreed that the uncertainty characterising these model components was 
predominantly epistemic in nature, it would seem appropriate to conduct further 
research on these components. 
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There seemed to be little consistency in the responses provided by the experts.  
Nonetheless, the study was successful in highlighting several sources of uncertainty at 
levels above and beyond the statistical uncertainty commonly reported on, as well as in 
making explicit a diversity of expert opinions on the uncertainty characterising 
transgene silencing.   
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5 Overall discussion & conclusion 
The goal of this chapter is to offer reflections on the experiences gained in the process 
of applying the W&H framework. It view of doing so, it is useful to begin by briefly 
recalling the premise upon which this project is based, as was outlined in chapter 1.  
The precautionary paradigm implies increased democratisation, adaptability and 
reflexivity in public decision making. Deliberation is used as a means of confronting 
different perspectives to oneanother, thereby highlighting disagreement and increasing 
reflexivity. Important topics of deliberation will include the quality of the information 
upon which a decision needs to be made, the precautionary measures warranted and the 
general desirability of technological innovations.  
The precautionary paradigm has profound implications for the role of experts in the 
decision-making process.  Rather than providing an optimal technical answer, the role 
of experts is to participate in the collective effort of producing, evaluating and applying 
knowledge, considering the interests at stake, and making a necessarily provisional 
decision.  Experts are now expected to reflect publicly on the quality of their 
knowledge, reveal their uncertainties and open up to questioning and confrontation by 
other members of the policy community. New institutional arrangements and 
methodologies are required to help experts assume their changed roles under the 
precautionary paradigm. An area in which there is an obvious need for methodological 
innovation is in uncertainty assessment.  Too often, the notion of uncertainty has been 
over simplified, if not neglected all together.  What has commonly been referred to 
under the umbrella term “uncertainty” actually hides important technical distinctions. 
The scientists and engineers performing regulatory assessments must emancipate 
themselves from the widespread statistical or probabilistic understanding of 
uncertainty, to recognize the full spectrum of the uncertainties characteristic of policy 
relevant science. Only communicating statistical uncertainty, or communicating 
scenario uncertainty and ignorance in statistical terms, risks conveying a pretence of 
high certainty, when this is not actually the case. 
Thus, there is a requirement for methods through which experts can systematically 
diagnose uncertainty at levels over and above statistical uncertainty, and explicitly 
communicate these uncertainties to the other actors in the policy community.  In the 
process of doing so, disagreements, and thereby the different perspectives on 
uncertainty, will be made more obvious. Information about uncertainty, and the 
different perspectives on this uncertainty, enrich the basis for deliberations on the 
quality of information.   
In view of the above, this project set off with the objective of developing the best 
possible method for diagnosing and describing the uncertainty characterising regulatory 
assessments.  The method developed was to be consistent with the body of literature on 
uncertainty, integrate the different conceptual approaches described in this body of 
literature, and thereby address levels of uncertainty above and beyond the statistical 
uncertainty commonly described by engineers and scientists. The pursuit of this 
objective lead to the development of the W&H conceptual framework for uncertainty 
analysis, in which uncertainty is described as a three dimensional concept, including the 
level, location and nature of uncertainty.   
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The initial perspective of the author of this dissertation was that if defined well enough, 
uncertainty at levels beyond statistical uncertainty could be identified and described in 
a unique, absolute fashion, similar to the way in which statistical uncertainty is 
described.  The different dimensions of uncertainty having been defined by Walker et 
al., (2003), the author set out to test the W&H framework.  The approach taken to test 
the framework was to develop an elicitation protocole in which the concepts put forth 
in the W&H framework were reflected, and to use the protocole to elicit experts on the 
uncertainty characterising the two case studies reported on in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation.   
In the first of these two empirical studies, the expert elicitations revealed three issues of 
potential concern that were left outside the scope of the risk assessment of herbicide 
tolerant oilseed crops. The results also drew attention to two areas within the risk 
assessment where knowledge was completely lacking. A striking feature of the results 
of the first study is the large diversity in the  expert opinions elicited. As is manifested 
in Figure 3.4, the elicitations highlighted considerable disagreement amongst experts 
regarding the level of uncertainty.  Figure 3.5 illustrates that considered individually, 
each of the experts varied relatively little in their judgements of the level of uncertainty. 
This suggests that the diversity of opinion observed could reflect the presence of 
different perspectives on uncertainty within the groups of experts that took part in the 
study.  However, these results could be confounded by the fact that the experts were 
anchoring there responses around a given value.  Also, the consistency test performed 
indicated that the experts interviewed were not using the concepts put forth in the 
W&H framework consistently (see Figure 3.6). This could indicate that, although care 
was taken to explain the level and nature dimensions of uncertainty, the novelty of the 
concepts involved, or ambiguity in the formulation of the questions, may have lead 
some experts to interpret the questions differently, or let personal biases influence their 
responses.   
The diversity and ambiguity of the results obtained in the first study lead to a change in 
the approach used in the second study. The strictly numerical scale used to determine 
the level of uncertainty in the first study (see Figure 3.2) was abandoned.  Instead, a set 
of pedigree criteria containing qualitative descriptors of the different levels of 
uncertainty was developed (see Table VII).  The second study successfully revealed 
that there are competing hypotheses regarding some of the cause effect relationships 
leading to transgene silencing, and that the experts elicited thought that certain 
components of the system model were characterized by high levels of scenario 
uncertainty and identified ignorance.  As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the results of the 
second study indicated a slight improvement in the consistency with which experts 
responded, which may be (partially) attributable to the use of the pedigree criteria to 
assess the level of uncertainty.  By and large however, notwithstanding the fact that 
generic descriptive formula were used to further characterize the terminology, 
consistency was still not a major feature of the responses elicited.  As was the case in 
the first case study, the results of the second elicitation study still display a considerable 
diversity of expert opinion (e.g., see Tables VIII and IX, and Figure 4.4).  Here again it 
is difficult to determine whether the diversity of the responses given reflects true 
disagreement amongst the experts, diverging interpretations of the questions asked to 
them, or both.   
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The ambiguity of the results generated in the two case studies performed may lead 
some to question the usefulness of investing the efforts required to perform the 
analysis.  However, it is important to recall that an important goal of such analyses is to 
provide substance to a deliberative decision making process, in view of fostering 
reflexivity. Within a deliberative policy making process, the interpretive flexibility 
offered by qualitative descriptors of uncertainty is not necessarily a negative thing. 
Although the use of relative terminology such as “considerable”, “good/bad”, “likely”, 
“uncertain” and “ignorance” may be a source of ambiguity, it also forces stakeholders 
to deliberate on the meaning of these terms, and can thereby help bridge the diversity of 
positions and framings held by the various actors involved (Shackley and Wynne, 
1997; Star and Griesemer, 1989; Eisenberg, 1984).   
The diversity of the responses provided by the experts in the two empirical studies 
conducted, as well as experience gained in discussing the W&H framework in various 
academic fora, suggest that there can be no absolute description of uncertainty.  As was 
illustrated by Rayner (2004), a variety of psychological and social factors will 
contribute to the way in which uncertainty is experienced, just as is the case with risk.  
Any characterisation of uncertainty will itself be uncertain (O'Riordan and McMichael, 
2002).  While the concepts put forth in the W&H framework seemed intuitive to it’s 
authors, this has not always proven to be the case in practice, and different, equally 
legitimate, conceptual arrangements could undoubtebly be devised to describe 
uncertainty.   
In view of the above, the initial perspective of the author of this dissertation, that by 
defining the different levels of uncertainty well enough, it would be possible to 
diagnose their presence in a case study and describe them using a conventional 
vocabulary that is universally understood, seems a rather naive remnent of the modern, 
positivistic paradigm. There will always be a plurality of perspectives on uncertainty, 
and uncertainty assessment can only aspire to make this transparent.  Thus, the relative 
value of the approach presented in this dissertation should be evaluated in terms of the 
extent to which it helped make a broad spectrum of uncertainties, and the plurality of 
perspectives on uncertainty, transparent. 
In both of the case studies presented in this dissertation, experts were successfully 
engaged in a dialogue that stimulated them to systematically reflect upon a broad 
spectrum of uncertainties.  In both of the cases studied, the experts identified levels of 
uncertainty above and beyond statistical uncertainty, and a large diversity of expert 
opinion was revealed.  On this basis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the approach 
applied here contributed to making a broad spectrum of uncertainties, as well as the 
plurality of perspectives on uncertainty, transparent.   
An avenue of future study would be to experiment with the W&H framework in a 
deliberative context.  This would require adapting the approach used in the current 
study to elicit individual experts, such that it could be used with focus groups.  The 
composition of focus groups could be representative of the variety of stakeholders in 
the regulatory debate.  In addition to the concepts put forth in the W&H framework, the 
members of a focus group would be stimulated to reflect on the opinions of their 
colleagues.  A heightened level of reflection could therefore be hoped for, provided that 
care was taken to avoid some of the pitfalls associated with group dynamics (e.g. the 
influence of pride and egos, hierarchal relationships based on status, etc...).  
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While it would seem beyond doubt that the applications of the W&H framework 
illustrated here generated reflection on behalf of the experts involved, it is difficult to 
gauge the extent to which the approach would be succesful in fostering reflexivity in 
decision making.  In view of doing so, it would be useful to identify parameters through 
which reflexivity can be gauged.  An example of one such parameter could be learning 
or adaptation. In other words, by observing the extent to which the insight gained by 
applying the W&H framework subsequently influences how decisions are made, it 
might be possible to evaluate the extent to which the approach is successful in fostering 
reflexivity. In an experimental context, this could be accomplished by simulating a 
decision making situation, by asking the participants in an eventual study to make a 
decision in view of the information on uncertainty they were presented. Another 
approach would be to study a case in practice in which uncertainty information was 
considered in the process leading up to a decision.   
There is no reason to believe that the shift from the modern to the precautionary 
paradigm will be easy.  Professional cultures are not easily transformed, especially in 
the situations of high stakes and disputed values that characterize many regulatory 
decision-making processes.  It is very likely that the shift, where it occurs, will proceed 
gradually and with difficulty as the different actors of the policy community increase 
their willingness to experiment with new modes of interaction and decision making.   
The approach presented in this dissertation is a methodological contribution aimed at 
facilitating the transition towards the precautionary paradigm. Applied regularly, 
uncertainty analyses such as those presented in this dissertation could contribute to the 
systematic characterisation and communication of forms of uncertainty that are rarely 
made explicit in policy sciences.  As such, they could make an important contribution 
to the basis for deliberations on the quality of the information underpinning policy 
decisions, the extent of the precautionary measures warranted, and the way in which 
monitoring resources should be allocated. Ultimately, this could lead to increased 
reflexivity in regulatory decision making.  
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